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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 20000044-CA

v.

:

JOSE MARIO JIMINEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of manslaughter, a second degree
felony, and two counts of attempted manslaughter, each third degree felonies. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mid-trial motion for
mistrial where the incidents of alleged prosecutorial misconduct were four isolated
questions spread out over the course of a four-day trial?
"On appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial

misconduct, because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's
impact on the proceedings, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of
discretion." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Wright, 893 P.2d
1113,1118 (Utah App. 1995). "'Unless a review of the record shows that the court's

decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the
defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's
decision was an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 274-75 (Utah
1998) (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997))
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for
mistrial at the end of closing argument where the prosecutor's comments in
closing did not undermine defendant's right not to be tried in prison clothes
but, rather, addressed only the evidence before the jury and the inferences
concerning defendant's credibility arising therefrom?
The same standard of review applies to this issue as applies to Issue I.

III.

Should defendant receive a new trial based on the cumulative error doctrine
where defendant has not demonstrated that any of the alleged errors
collectively deprived him of a fair trial?
A court will reverse a conviction under the cumulative error doctrine "only if the

cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was
had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules determine this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 29,1998, defendant was charged by amended information with one count
of criminal homicide, a first degree felony; with two counts of attempted criminal
homicide, also first degree felonies; and withfirearmenhancements, all in connection
with a shooting at a local 7-Eleven store (R. 4-7, 12-14). Before trial, defendant filed

several motions in limine, including one requesting the exclusion of prior crimes evidence
(R. 151-56, 193-94, 339, 343:168-75). The trial court accepted the parties' stipulation
that the State would not address defendant's prior convictions except to rebut any
character evidence offered by defendant (R. 339:20, 343:172-75).
At trial, defendant made two motions for mistrial based on prosecutorial
misconduct. The trial court denied both motions (R. 344:455-76; R. 345:708-11).
After a four-day trial, defendant was convicted by jury of one count of
manslaughter and two counts of attempted manslaughter (R. 282-87). The jury also found
that defendant had used a firearm in each of those crimes (Id.).
Defendant was sentenced to one to fifteen years and a consecutive firearm
enhancement term on the manslaughter count, and to zero to five years and a consecutive
firearm enhancement term on each of the attempted manslaughter counts (R. 308-16).
The trial court ordered that defendant's manslaughter term run consecutive to his
concurrent attempted manslaughter terms (Id.).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 321).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 20,1996, defendant opened fire on three unarmed men in a 7-Eleven
parking lot. Two of the men were able to shelter themselves from harm. The third was
killed when defendant fired two bullets at point blank range into his chest as he sat in a
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parked car. The shooting and killing were recorded by the store's security camera (St.
Exh. 1).
On October 20, 1996, Henry David Miera went out with his girlfriend, Daphne
Sanchez, and friends Manuel Rios and Anthony Montoya to a bar named Shooters (R.
343:226-27, 271-72; St. Exh. 6 at 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 3). After drinking and dancing, the
foursome left the bar, stopped for more beer, and took Ms. Sanchez home (Id.). The three
men then stopped at a 7-Eleven so that Rios could use the restroom (Id.). Miera was in
the driver's seat; Montoya was on the passenger side (R. 343:232; St. Exh. 6 at 1-2).
Rios, a former boxer who weighed about 330 pounds, went into the store (R. 343:233; St.
Exh. 1). It was about 1:22 a.m. (Id.).
Rios was still in the store when a black car pulled in next to Miera's white one (R.
343:233; St. Exh. 1). Defendant's wife got out of the passenger's side of the black car
and went into the store to use the restroom (R. 344: 434-35,442; St. Exh. 1). Defendant
got out of the driver's side and, after retrieving his gunfromunder his seat and sticking it
in the front of his pants, approached the white car (R. 343:232-42; R. 344:562, 570; St.
Exh. 1). Defendant asked Montoya and Miera whether they had a problem, i.e., whether
they "wantfed] to fight or something" (R. 343:244; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 3).
Rios, hearing the confrontation, quickly left the store and asked defendant whether
he had a problem (R. 343:234-35,245,247; R. 344:562; St. Exh. 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 6).
Montoya, who was slightly smaller than Rios, got out of the car and joined Rios (R.
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343:235, 246; St. Exh. 1). Miera, however, remained in the car, "just sitting" there,
saying nothing (R. 343:235; St. Exh. 1).
Despite the fact that defendant was much smaller than Rios and Montoya, he
showed no sign of backing down when they approached him (R. 343:245-46; St. Exh. 1;
Def. Exh. 3 A at 4). Instead, defendant reached for the gun in the front of his pants (R.
343:236-37, 277). In response, Rios punched defendant and then turned immediately and
ran to the other side of the white car, "just duckin"' (R. 343:236-37; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6
at 5; Def. Exh. 3A at 5-7). Montoya followed Rios as defendant fell backwards to the
ground (R. 344:438; St. Exh. 1). Miera opened his car door but then quickly shut it again
because defendant, though still on the ground, had opened fire (R. 344:438-39, 501, 54647; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 3-5, 7; Def. Exh. 3A at 5).
As defendant got upfromthe ground, he shot into the driver's side of the car and
killed Miera (R. 343:237-38, 298, 301; St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 5). One of the shots went
through Miera's rib, lung, and heart (R. 343:295-96). The second shot hit Miera's
diaphragm, spleen, aorta, liver, and lung (Id.). Defendant then moved in front of the car
and, after apparently clearing a gun jam, continuedfiringon Rios and Montoya (R.
343:237-38; R: 344:548; St. Exh. 1; Def. Exh. 3A at 5).
During the shooting, defendant's wife took cover behind a 7-Eleven door (R.
344:443; St. Exh. 1). Defendant then signaled to her to get back into their car (R.

5

343:238; R. 344:440; St. Exh. 1). As defendant drove away, Rios and Montoya threw
beer bottles and firewood at defendant's car (R. 343:238; R. 344:440).
After realizing that Miera had been shot, Rios and Montoya pulled him out of the
car and tried to revive him (St. Exh. 1; St. Exh. 6 at 10; Def. Exh.. at 9). Paramedics soon
arrived and Miera was eventually transported to the hospital by helicopter (R. 343:305,
313-14; R. 344:543; St. Exh. 1).
After the shooting, defendant parked his car in the garage of a friend, Amber
Fabela (R. 343:192, 316; R:444:448). He and his wife then went over to another friend's
home, which turned out to be where Amber also was (R. 343:186-87). Defendant, "in
hysterics," told them, "I just killed somebody" (R. 343:187). Defendant then fled; his
wife did not see him again for two years (R. 344:478, 591).
Police arrived at the 7-Eleven shortly after the shooting and found five slugs and
seven casings around or implanted in the white car (R. 343:308, 309, 313, 343).
Although defendant later claimed Miera had a gun, no gun was found at the scene (R.
343:219, 233, 309-10, 315; St. Exh. 6 at 8). Rios testified that if he had had a gun, he
would have used it (R. 343:238).
Additional facts. Additional facts will be included in the relevant portions of the
argument section of this brief.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct fail. None of the instances of
alleged misconduct were significant enough to call an improper matter to the jury's
attention. Furthermore, none of the alleged misconduct, considered individually or
collectively, was so substantial and prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MID-TRIAL MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
WHERE NONE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S QUESTIONS ROSE TO
THE LEVEL OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant claims that four questions asked by the prosecutor over the course of a

four-day were so prejudicial to his case that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his mid-trial motion for mistrial. See Aplt. Br. at 10-34. However, none of the alleged
errors were sufficiently substantial or prejudicial to warrant a new trial.
A.

Defendant's claim that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct by blatantly violating the trial court's pretrial order fails on the merits where it made no reference
to defendant's prior bad acts during its case-in-chief.

Defendant claims that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by
"interjecting]... improper, offensive information . . . [i]n blatant disregard" for the trial
court's pre-trial ruling on his motion in limine. Aplt. Br. at 20. Defendant's claim fails,
however, because the State did not violate the court's order at trial.
On April 23,1999, defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence of
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Prior Convictions, requesting that evidence of prior offenses be excluded under rules 402,
403, and 609, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 151-52, 155-56). Twice before trial, the State
stipulated that it would not elicit any evidence concerning defendant's prior convictions
or bad acts in its case-in-chief (R. 339:20; R. 343:173-75; Addendum A). However, both
times, the State reserved the right to present such evidence if defendant "is going to bring
in his character for being a peaceable person in the furtherance of a self-defense claim"
(R. 193-94; R. 339:20; R. 343:169, 173-75; Add. A). Defendant accepted the stipulation
(R. 339:20; Add. A). The court then ruled that it would take the State's motion under
advisement, noting that if, in presenting his case, "Mr. Jiminez has placed his character at
issue, . . . clearly the State would be entitled to rebut" (R. 343:175; Add. A).1
Consistent with its prior stipulation and the trial court's pre-trial order, the State
presented no evidence concerning defendant's prior convictions in its case-in-chief (R.
343:182-349). The State did not, therefore, violate the trial court's pre-trial order.
B.

The impact on the jury in a four-day trial from four
allegedly improper questions posed by the prosecutor,
three of which went unanswered after objection, was not
so substantial and prejudicial as to constitute
prosecutorial misconduct requiring a new trial.

Defendant claims that the prosecutor "circumvented evidentiary rules . . . on four
separate occasions in order to get information in front of the jury that it was not allowed

!

In the record, defendant's last name appears both as Jiminez and Jimenez. In this
brief, the State will use the spelling, "Jiminez."
8

to consider." Aplt. Br. 10, 12. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's misconduct "was
particularly contemptuous in this case" because, "in a deliberate fashion, the prosecutor
interjected the improper, offensive information in an effort to influence and inflame the
jury... [i]n blatant disregard of the rules." Aplt. Br. at 20.
In support of his claim, defendant identifies four questions asked by the prosecutor
in cross examination during the second and third days of a four-day trial. See Aplt. Br. at
13-18. Specifically, defendant challenges one question directed at defendant concerning
his use of aliases; one question directed at his wife concerning whether she knew it was
illegal for defendant to carry a concealed weapon; one question directed at his wife
concerning whether she assisted that night in concealing defendant; and one question
directed at his medical expert concerning other violence to which defendant may have
been exposed in the past. See Aplt. Br. at 13-18.
However, to succeed on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must
show both that the prosecutor called to the jury's attention a matter it would not be
justified in considering in reaching its verdict, and that, under the circumstances of this
particular case, the prosecutor's comments were so substantial and prejudicial that there is
a reasonable likelihood that, absent the comments, the result of the trial would have been
more favorable to defendant. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7; State v.
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352-53 (Utah 1997); State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah
App. 1998). Defendant has not done so here. Notwithstanding the emotionally-charged
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language in defendant's brief, none of the prosecutor's questions constituted prosecutorial
misconduct warranting a new trial under this test.
1.

Proceedings below.

Defendant's use of aliases. Defendant was the first person to testify for the
defense (R. 343:363). He did so in order to lay foundation for subsequent expert
testimony concerning the effects of prior head trauma on how defendant would likely
respond to being punched by Rios at the 7-Eleven (R. 343:349, 363-69).
In laying the necessary foundation, defendant explained that he had been robbed
and attacked with clubs by three or four different people in 1994 (R. 343:371; Addendum
B). The medical records produced from the attack, however, were in the name of Antonio
Sanchez (R. 343:366; Add. B). Defendant explained that he had used an alias to procure
medical treatment "[b]ecause I didn't have money to pay the bills" (R. 343:366; Add. B).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "These aren't the only other false
names that you've used, are they?" (R. 343:369; Add. B). Before defendant could
answer, his counsel objected and requested an unrecorded side-bar conference {Id.).
Upon completion of the side-bar, the prosecutor did not renew his question concerning
aliases (R. 343:369; Add. B). The prosecutor moved on to a different subject and did not
revisit the issue at any time during the remaining two days of trial (R. 343:369; Add. B).
Defendant's violent history. Robert Keith Rothfeder, defendant's medical expert,
testified that, because of the 1994 trauma, defendant would likely react more vigorously
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to the 7-Eleven incident than would one who had suffered no prior head trauma (R.
344:382, 398-99).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if defendant had given Rothfeder "any
other history of violence that he has had" (R. 344:403; Addendum C). Defendant
objected to the question and an off-the-record side-bar was held (Id.). After the trial court
overruled defendant's objection, the prosecutor reworded his question to address "other
history of violence that [defendant's] been involved in" (Id.). Rothfeder indicated that he
had asked defendant about any other history of serious trauma and that defendant had
indicated there was none (R. 344:404; Add. C). After Rothfeder's response, the
prosecutor did not revisit the issue of defendant's violent history again throughout the
remainder of the trial.
Defendant's illegal possession of a concealed weapon. Defendant's wife was the
next witness called (R. 344:430). She testified that, on the night of the shooting, she and
her husband had gone to Mi Mexico (R. 344:433). She explained that they didn't get a
chance to go out much with a nine-month-old child, and that, on that night, they stayed at
the club for about four hours (R. 344:433). She testified that she did not see her husband
with a gun until after he had been punched by Rios (R. 344:444).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "Did you know that the concealed
weapon under that circumstance would be a crime in and of itself?" (R. 344:444;
Addendum D). Before Ms. Jiminez could answer, defense counsel objected and
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requested an unrecorded side-bar (Id.). The trial court then sustained defendant's
objection on the record but declined defendant's request for a curative instruction (R.
344:445; Add. D). Defendant never placed on the record either the basis for his objection
or the substance of the instruction he apparently requested.
The prosecutor revisited the subject matter of its question only in response to
defendant's closing argument (R. 345:694; Add. D). In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued
that the important question was not whether, as defendant had argued, defendant had a
constitutional right to possess a firearm or not, but, rather, whether possession of the
firearm at that particular time was probative of defendant's state of mind when he
approached the white car (R. 345:694-95; Add. D).2
Defendant's flight. Also during cross-examination of Ms. Jiminez, the prosecutor
asked whether she had participated in concealing defendant from the police after the
shooting (R. 344:450; Addendum E). Defendant objected and outside the presence of the
jury, the court explained that an answer to that question could be self-incriminating (R.
344:451; Add. E). Defendant stated: "If the question is what did she observe, I think
that's a proper question" (R. 344:453; Add. E).

2

In denying defendant's motion for a mistrial at the close of argument, the court
ruled that, although arguing propensity to violate the law is a touchy area, the State could
properly argue that defendant's possession of the concealed gun went to defendant's state
of mind at the time of the confrontation and supported the inference that defendant was
the aggressor (R. 345:708-10; Add. D). Defendant has not challenged this portion
of the State's closing argument on appeal.
12

When the jury returned, the court stated: 'Til sustain the objection that was made
earlier by defense counsel and ask [the State] to move to a new line of questioning" (R.
344:477; Add. E). The prosecutor then questioned Ms. Jiminez regarding whether she
observed defendant concealing himself to avoid arrest after the shooting (R. 344:477;
Add. E).
Defendant moves for mistrial. During a break in Ms. Jiminez's testimony,
defendant moved for a mistrial (R. 344:455; Addendum F). Defendant argued that the
State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it asked defendant whether he had used
aliases other than Antonio Sanchez, when it asked defendant's medical expert whether he
was aware of any other prior violence with which defendant had been involved other than
the alleged 1994 incident; and when it alluded to uncharged 404(b) evidence during its
questioning of defendant's wife (R. 344:456-57,463; Add. F).
Defendant argued that the State's question about defendant's use of other aliases
was improper innuendo because it was not supported by admissible evidence (R. 344:457;
Add. F). Defendant challenged the State's question to his medical expert on the same
basis (R. 344:463; Add. F). In response, the State presented to court with State's Exh. 9,
an FBI rap sheet identifying various aliases used by defendant, as well as prior violent
criminal acts committed by him (R. 344:459-60; State's Exh. 9; Add. F). The State also
argued that it "had the right to inquire about the basis for [the doctor's] opinion" (R.
344:460; Add. F).
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Defendant challenged the State's reference to defendant's illegally carrying a
concealed weapon as improper because the State had not charged defendant with that
crime (R. 344:458; Add. F). The State responded that the questions asked Ms. Jiminez
were "not improper questioning in terms of uncharged criminal conduct" because the
conduct was "part of this criminal episode. The fact that it is criminal doesn't mean we
don't get to inquire about it" (R. 344:460-61; Add. F). Furthermore, the evidence is
relevant to rebut defendant's claim that the victims were the aggressors in this case (R.
344:461; Add. F).
Motion denied. Ruling on the motion, the court agreed that, although there was a
basis for it, the State's question regarding aliases was improper because it was not
supported by admissible evidence (R. 344:469; Add. F). However, any prejudicial effect
of the question "[was] mitigated somewhat by the fact that Mr. Jiminez had admitted on
direct examination he used an alias and admitted on cross-examination he [had
previously] lied and [given] his health care provider false information" (R. 344:470; Add.
F). Thus, "the unfair harm to the defendant's case does not, based on that problem alone,
require a mistrial" (R. 344:471; Add. F).
The court then ruled that whether defendant had brought the weapon to the store
and concealed it "may go to his state of mind" and is thus relevant "in determining
whether he or the assailants were the aggressors" (R. 344:471; Add. F). Regarding the
question concerning the illegality of a concealed weapon, "I sustained the objection" and
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no answer was given (R. 344:471-72; Add. F). Thus, "there wasn't sufficient unfair harm
to the defendant's case such that a mistrial would be warranted" (R. 344:472; Add. F).
Finally, regarding the questioning of defendant's medical expert, the court held
that "[wjhether [defendant] had head injuries from any source that may have had this
concussive impact was relevant" (R. 344:472; Add. F). Furthermore, defendant's
objection to the State's reference to defendant's violent behavior had been sustained (R.
344:472; Add. F). Thus, again, "there's not enough unfair damage to Mr. Jiminez' case
based on that question to warrant a mistrial" (R. 344:472; Add. F). The court thus denied
defendant's motion (R. 344:470; Add. F).
Jury instructions. At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed to ignore all
evidence to which an objection was sustained and any evidence offered but not admitted
(R. 238; Instr. 6). "[Y]ou must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been or
as to the reason for the objection" (Id.).
2.

Standard of Review.

"Because the trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's
impact on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial
motion based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion." State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,276 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah
1993). "'Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in
that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have
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had a fair trial, [this Court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of
discretion.'" Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274-75 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1231 (Utah 1997)).
3.

Under facts of this case, the four challenged
questions did not significantly call to the
jury's attention any matter it would not be
justified in considering in reaching its
verdict.

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's questions improperly placed before the jury
evidence of defendant's bad acts and criminal conduct that the jury should not have
considered in reaching its verdict. See Aplt. Br. at 19. However, defendant does not
show how any of the questions challenged on appeal necessarily raises an improper
inference that defendant himself had not already raised. Cf. State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d
531, 547 (Mo.) (en banc) ("Unless the testimony objected to consists of clear evidence of
another crime, there is no trial court abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial."), cert
denied, 120 S. Ct. 431 (1999).
First, it is pure conjecture whether the jury understood the question regarding the
illegality of defendant's carrying a concealed weapon as indicating that defendant had a
criminal past Cf. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, f 19, 8 P.3d 1025 (finding no prosecutorial
misconduct where "it is extremely unlikely that the jury drew the inference [defendant]
describes"). Furthermore, in the State's final rebuttal during closing argument, the State
made clear to the jury that the illegality of defendant's conduct in having the gun was
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irrelevant (R. 345:694). Thus, the State essentially argued that this was not a matter
which the jury would be justified in considering in reaching its verdict. See Kohl, 2000
UT 35 at U17; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352-53; Basta, 966 P.2d at 268.3
Second, "[t]he use of an alias does not constitute clear evidence associating
defendant with other crimes." Brown, 998 S.W.2d at 547. Thus, the State's reference
alone would not have necessarily placed such evidence before the jury. See Brown, 998
S.W.2d at 547. Moreover, defendant's use of aliases had already been put before the jury
by his own testimony on direct that he had used an alias in 1994 to obtain free medical
services (R. 343:366). Thus, the State's question placed no issue before the jury that
defendant had not already raised. Cf. People v. Huynh, 626 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (App. Div.
1995) (memorandum decision) (concluding that prosecutor could inquire further into
aliases after defendant had opened the door and placed his credibility in issue by
testifying that he used aliases because of confusion about his real name); Chase v. State,
541 P.2d 867, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (holding that defendant opened door to

3

As the trial court noted in denying defendant's motion for mistrial after closing
argument, the State revisited the issue of whether defendant could legally possess a
weapon only in rebuttal to defendant's claim, in his closing argument, that he had such a
right under the second amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 345:708-10). See
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422,426 (Utah 1973) (concluding no prosecutorial misconduct
where prosecutor's remarks were "in direct reply to the theory advanced by defense
counsel in his final argument"); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,925 (Utah App. 1990)
(holding that prosecutor does not commit misconduct in responding to argument
defendant addressed in his closing).
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prosecution questions concerning aliases by implying on direct examination that alias
disclosed was only alias ever used).
Third, the question to the expert concerning "any other history of violence that
[defendant] has had" could just as easily have been understood to ask to whether
defendant had been a victim of any additional violence as whether he had been a
perpetrator. In fact, the expert's response to the State's reworded question made clear
that the relevant issue was whether defendant had experienced additional head trauma in
the past under any circumstances (R. 344:404).
Finally, there is no evidence that Ms. Jiminez had asserted her right against selfincrimination. However, even assuming arguendo that it was error to ask Ms. Jiminez
whether she helped defendant conceal himself because the answer may have incriminated
her, the issue of defendant's concealment itself was properly before the jury as evidence
of defendant's consciousness of guilt. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |23 & n.6, 10
P.3d 346 (noting that evidence of flight is admissible as probative of consciousness of
guilt); State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987) (same); Eliott v. State, 27 S.W.3d
432 (Ark. 2000) ("When evidence of a prior crime reflects a consciousness of guilt, it is
independently relevant and admissible under Rule 4040(b)."); Davis v. State, 722 So. 2d
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143, 145 f 6 (Miss. 1998) (same); State v. Berosik, 988 P.2d 775, 780 f27 (Mont. 1999)
(same); United States v. Robinson, 161 F.3d463, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).4
Thus, none of the four questions challenged on appeal sufficiently called to the
jury's attention matters which it would not be justified in considering in reaching its
verdict as to constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
4.

None of the allegedly improper questions
were so substantial and prejudicial that there
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the
questions, defendant would have been
acquitted

Defendant asserts that the State's questions "presented the jury with an opportunity
to assume that Jimenez was a bad person and was probably guilty of the crimes at issue
because he was violent or had committed other crimes, or that Jimenez had something to
hide about his past." Aplt. Br. at 21-22. He then claims that he was prejudiced by the
questions because they "may have added critical weight to the prosecutor's case" in a case
that "came down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses"
where the evidence presented by defendant "would have absolved Jimenez of the crimes."
Aplt. Br. at 22, 25-26. However, defendant's claim fails where the prosecutor's questions

; 4Despite defendant's suggestion on appeal that the trial court sustained defendant's
objection to questions concerning defendant's concealment as "criminal conduct... that
had not been charged in this matter," Aplt. Br. at 17-18, in fact, the court only sustained
the objection to the question concerning his wife's participation in the concealment (R.
344:454, 477). As defendant's trial counsel acknowledged, defendant's wife could
properly testify as to what she observed concerning defendant's concealment (R. 344:453
("If the question is what did she observe, I think that's a proper question.")).
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were not obviously improper, where they were isolated questions occurring over the
course of a four-day trial, and where the evidence against defendant was substantial.
In determining whether a statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, "'the
statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" State
v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d
848, 852 (Utah App. 1992)). A jury's verdict must be upheld if "a review of the entire
record does not indicate, absent the improper question, there was a reasonable likelihood
defendant would have been found not guilty." State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390
(Utah 1977); see also State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787 (Utah App. 1991) (holding
that question is, "[specifically, would the jury have been more likely to acquit
[defendant]... on his self-defense claim, if the improper comment had not been made?").
Factors relevant to that determination include the frequency with which the
statements are made, the strength of the State's case, the plausibility of defendant's
exculpatory explanation, and whether the jury was instructed concerning the statements.
See. e.g., Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274; State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981);
State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339,
345 (Utah App. 1993).
The questions, even if improper, were isolated. Here, defendant challenges four
different questions asked on the second and third day of a four-day trial in which fourteen
witnesses were called.
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One of the questions challenged, and the only one to which the State actually
received an answer, was relevant to determine the extent of the expert's knowledge of
defendant and the basis of the expert's opinion. See, e.g., Storey v. State, 552 N.E.2d
477, 482 (Ind. 1990) (holding State may "attempt[] to refute the opinion of the
defendant's [medical expert] by attacking the information upon which it was based");
State v. Thompson, 985 S.W.2d 779, 786-87 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
The other three questions were never even answered; rather, in those instances, the
jury heard defendant object, observed counsel and the court in an off-the-record side-bar,
and then saw the State drop its prior question and move on to a new subject (R. 343:369
(question concerning use of alias; no indication on the record that objection sustained);
344:444-45 (question concerning defendant's illegal possession of concealed weapon;
objection sustained on the record); R. 344:477 (question concerning wife's assisting to
conceal defendant; objection sustained on the record)).
Moreover, the State made no further reference to the subject matter of any of the
four questions during the remainder of the trial, except briefly in response to defendant's
closing argument. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274 (holding no prejudice where single
statement, made in the course of a long trial, was not relied upon or referred to again by
the prosecutor); State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997) (holding frequency of
comment is relevant in determining prejudice); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (same).
This is not a case, then, in which the State made repeated attempts to inflame or
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place improper evidence before the jury. Thus, the cases relied upon by defendant are
distinguishable. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992) (finding
misconduct where prosecutor made repeated attempts to have defendant admit he had
rehearsed testimony with counsel); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (finding
misconduct where prosecutor made repeated references to defendant's use of aliases and
prior bad acts); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (finding misconduct where prosecutor's
comments not isolated); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 345 (finding misconduct where prosecutor's
improper statements were pervasive); State v. Bain, 575 P.2d 919, 922 (Mont. 1978)
(finding misconduct where prosecutor has made repeated attempts to offer evidence
previously ruled inadmissible);
"It is conceivable that under some circumstances the asking of improper questions
might by suggestion or innuendo have the effect the defendant contends. Yet if our rules
were based on such an assumption, there would be little need or incentive for the trial
court to rule correctly on objections." State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322,
1324 (Utah 1974). Thus, prejudice is rarely established where, uas the record stands,
there is nothing but an improper question which remains wholly unanswered." Requa v.
Daly-Judge Mining Co., 46 Utah 92,148 P. 448,451 (Utah 1915). Cf. Harmon, 956 P.2d
at 274; Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297.
Evidence against defendant was substantial and corroborated. Furthermore,
despite defendant's claim otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 25-26, this case did not come down
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to the word of the defense against the word of the state's witnesses.
The State's evidence was substantial. It established that Rios and his friends were
unarmed when they stopped at the 7-Eleven on October 20 to let Rios use the restroom.
Defendant pulled in shortly thereafter, retrieved his gun from under his seat, and
confronted Miera and Montoya, who were still in the car. Although much smaller than
either Rios or Montoya, defendant did not retreat from them but, rather, reached for his
gun. In response, Rios punched defendant in the face and immediately turned and ran.
Montoya followed. Defendant began shooting at them while he was still on the ground.
Once back standing, he fired two shots into Miera's chest and then resumed shooting at
Rios and Montoya. He fired seven shots in all before calling his wife and leaving the
scene. He then hid his car in a friend's garage, admitted to friends that he had killed
someone, and fled the State.
Although the majority of this evidence came from two eye-witnesses, Rios and
Montoya, their testimony was corroborated not only by the video taken by the 7-Eleven
surveillance camera and the State's other witnesses, but also by two defense witnesses,
John Moyes and Ron Edwards, as well as defendant himself. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at
274; Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297; Palmer, 860 P.2d at 345 (all
noting that prejudice more likely where case depends primarily on resolution of
conflicting evidence consisting of uncorroborated testimony).
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Defendant's exculpatory explanations were weak. Defendant's defense at trial
was a mix of self-defense and a sort of momentary lack of control due to prior head
trauma suffered in 1994. Neither of these defenses was strong.
First, defendant immediately raised questions concerning his credibility when he
began his defense by admitting that he had previously used an alias and lied to medical
providers to get out of paying for — i.e., to steal—medical services.
Second, defendant testified that he carried a gun because he was afraid and wanted
to protect himself and his wife (R. 344:568, 570). This testimony was incredible for
several reasons. Defendant did not carry a gun after he was allegedly viciously attacked
in 1994 (R. 344:568). Furthermore, he could not explain the source of his fear in 1996
(R. 344:568). Finally, defendant fled the State after the shooting, leaving his wife
essentially unprotected (R. 344:478, 590-91).
Third, defendant claimed that he did not initiate the confrontation with Rios and
his friends (R. 344:560-62). However, he also testified that he specifically put the gun
into his pants when he arrived at the 7-Eleven; and that he went over to the white car
because he heard murmurs and, although he could not understand what was being said, he
knew that he was being insulted (R. 344:560-61, 570-71).
Fourth, defendant claimed that he only pulled his gun and started shooting after
having seen Miera with a gun (R. 344:563). However, Rios testified that he and his
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friends were unarmed that night and Detective Mark R. Chidester testified that no gun
was found at the scene (R. 343:219, 233, 309-10, 315; R. 344:563).5
Fifth, defendant claimed that he shot at Miera and the others only because he
wanted them to leave him alone (R. 344:440, 565). However, defendant fired seven shots
that night at people who were unarmed (R. 343:308-09, 313, 343). Furthermore, Rios and
Montoya were running away from defendant when he shot at them, and defendant
returned to the driver's side of the white car in order to shoot Miera point blank when
Miera had never even threatened him (R. 343:235-38; R. 344:438, 548). Cf. Harrison,
805 P.2d at 787 (holding that rejection of defendant's claim of self-defense did not
indicate prejudice where jury "had ample reason to reject the assertion that [the victim]
had been armed, quite apart from any impact the prosecutor's comment may have had").
Finally, in support of his "temporary loss of control" defense, defendant's own
medical expert testified that, despite any head trauma suffered in the past, defendant
would nonetheless have understood that night that he was shooting at people and that he
could possibly kill them (R. 344:411,413). According to the expert, Defendant just
wouldn't know whether he was shooting out of revenge, defense, or anger (R. 344:424).

5

Defendant claims the reason for this was because the police officers' investigation
was deficient. See Aplt. Br. at 25. However, defendant called two witnesses on this
issue. One testified that the scene would have been substantially contaminated by the
presence of a medical helicopter and personnel attempting to save Miera's life, that
saving his life took precedence over preservation of the crime scene, and that the officer's
recovery of five out of seven projectiles and seven out of seven casings was "pretty good"
under the circumstances and would constitute "a good search" (R:344:541-45, 552).
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Jury instructions mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the jury was
instructed to ignore all evidence to which an objection was sustained and all evidence
offered but not admitted (R. 238: Instr. 6). See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 24, 999 P.2d
7 (holding that defendant must show comment was so prejudicial "as to defeat the
mitigating effect of the court's . . . curative instructions"). Defendant concedes that he
did not always ensure that the trial court's rulings on objections were on the record. See
Aplt. Br. at 27. However, as to the three questions to which objections were sustained
(whether immediately or subsequently), the jury heard defendant object, observed counsel
and the court in an off-the-record side-bar, and then saw the State drop its prior question
and move on to a new subject (R. 343:369 (question concerning use of alias; no indication
on the record that objection sustained); 344:444-45 (question concerning defendant's
illegal possession of concealed weapon; objection sustained on the record); R. 344:477
(question concerning wife's assisting to conceal defendant; objection sustained on the
record)). It is reasonable to assume that the jury understood, based on how defendant's
objections were handled, that the court had in fact sustained them. The jury's verdicts,
acquitting defendant of the greater offenses of murder and attempted murder and finding
him guilty only of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter, indicate that it heeded that
instruction. Cf. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988) (holding "fact that the
jury acquitted defendant of two of the four charges indicates that the verdict was a result

26

of a reasoned application of the law, rather than prejudice engendered by the improper
evidence.").
Conclusion. To succeed on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, "the 'mere
possibility' of a different outcome occurring without the [misconduct] is not enough;
instead, cthe likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f26, 974 P.2d 269. Here, "a
review of the entire record does not indicate, absent the [allegedly] improper questions],
there is a reasonable likelihood defendant would have been found not guilty." Peterson,
560 P.2d at 1390; see also Harrison, 805 P.2d at 787.
II.

BECAUSE THE STATE COULD PROPERLY COMPARE
DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR AT TRIAL TO
HIS APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR AT THE TIME OF THE
SHOOTING, THE STATE'S COMPARISON IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT WAS NOT PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant claims that, during closing argument, the State violated defendant's

right to be tried in the "garb of innocence" by comparing his appearance at trial in a suit
and tie with Rios's appearance in prison clothes and shackles. See Aplt. Br. at 29.
However, because the State made no such comparison, but, rather, properly addressed
defendant's credibility in light of the evidence presented, the State's comments did not
constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
A.

Proceedings below.

Prior to the parties' closing arguments, the court verbally instructed the jury that
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"nothing the attorneys say in argument is evidence" (R. 345:637, 639). The court also
issued a written instruction providing that the jury "should not consider as evidence any
statement of counsel made during the trial, unless such statement was made as a
stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts" (R. 250; Instr. 18).
The State's closing argument consists of 26 pages of trial transcript (R. 345:642667). In approximately the middle of the argument, the State commented that "[t]here are
reasons to believe and not to believe witnesses" (R. 345:656; Addendum G). The State
then commented on "the credibility of the Jiminezes," noting, for example, their
"extremely selective memory" (R. 345:657; Add. G). The State continued:
He can't remember shooting. He can't remember
aiming. He can't remember clearing the jam. He can't
remember loading the gun. He can't remember the recoil. He
can't remember those things that are important to him.
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and
his credibility as to the events, you have had a chance to
see not only the defendant in this courtroom today and
this week with how he presents himself, with how he
packages himself in appearance and dress and haircut and
glasses and demeanor, in temper or lack thereof, you have
seen him in every one of those aspects on [the 7-Eleven
surveillance tape recorded] October 20th, 1996. Is this an
honest packaging?
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios should
be in chains. But Manny Rios isn't anything except what
Manny Rios is. But you have—and I recall—I want you to
recall Mr. Shapiro's opening statement, and he was
talking about the news—the couple, not newly married
couple, but the couple, they had gotten their child a babysitter and they were able to go out for this date* Just your
average couple. And on the other hand we had the
drunken rowdy trouble making boxers cruising for
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trouble. Is either one of those portrayals [of the actors on
the night of the crime] honest now that you know the
situation? Or is it part of the packaging?
(R. 345:659-60; Add. G) (emphasis added). No further reference was made to Rios
during this part of the State's argument. However, later in the same argument, the State
reminded the jury: "You got to view the deportment of both the defendant and his wife on
the stand" (R. 345:664; Add. G). It then asked the jury to "[w]atch the tape" and
"[rjealize the packaging today as it is today and as it was then" (R. 345:666; Add. G).
Defendant did not object to any of the foregoing statements made during the
State's initial closing argument. However, defendant did object several times during the
State's rebuttal, (R. 345:688, 692, 696), and the jury was reminded "that nothing the
attorneys say is evidence," (R. 345:689). Defendant does not challenge any of the
rebuttal statements on appeal.
After the jury was excused to deliberate, defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming,
inter alia, that the State had improperly compared Rios's appearance in court to that of
defendant's (R. 345:701; Addendum H). The State argued that the State's comments did
not compare defendant's appearance and deportment to that of Rios, but rather compared
defendant's appearance and deportment at the time of trial to his appearance and
deportment at the time of the crime; and defendant's portrayal of both himself and Rios at
the time of the crime with the actual evidence of their appearance at the time of the crime.
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(R. 345:702-03; Add. H). Such comment, argued the State, was proper where defendant
took the stand and placed his credibility in issue (R. 345:702; Add. H).
In denying defendant's motion for mistrial, the court noted that, "in opening
arguments and during Mr. Jiminez' own testimony, the defendant attempted to present to
the jury an appearance or an image of what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention
was" (R. 345:709; Add. H). "It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to make an effort to
contradict that image" (Id.).
B.

Standard of Review

As discussed above, to establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must
demonstrate both that the prosecutor called to the jury's attention a matter it would not be
justified in considering in reaching its verdict, and that, under the circumstances of this
particular case, the prosecutor's comments were so substantial and prejudicial that there is
a reasonable likelihood that, absent the comments, the result of the trial would have been
more favorable to defendant. See Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at f 17; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 135253; Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. "4[T]he [challenged] statements or conduct must be viewed in
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected
the fairness of the trial.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah App.) (quoting State v.
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475,480 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998).
However, where, as here, the trial court has already ruled on defendant's claim,
this Court will not reverse that decision "absent an abuse of discretion." Harmon, 956
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P.2d at 276; see also Hay, 859 P.2d at 6. An abuse of discretion exists only if "a review
of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial." Harmon,
956 P.2d at 274-75 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231).
C

Because the State may properly comment on the
credibility of a defendant who has testified on his own
behalf and because the State's comments on defendant's
appearance and deportment were based on the evidence
and were offered to rebut defendant's claim that he was
an innocent victim guilty only of self-defense, the State's
comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

Defendant asserts that the State's comments on defendant's appearance and
demeanor improperly referred to defendant's right to appear at trial in the "garb of
innocence" by comparing defendant's appearance at trial in a suit with Rios's appearance
at trial in prison clothes. Aplt. Br. at 30 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473
(Utah App. 1991)). However, the challenged statements, considered both in isolation and
context, do not support defendant's claim.
Numerous courts have held that, once a defendant testifies at his trial, "[i]t is fair
comment for the State to point out the difference in defendant's appearance at the time of
the incident and at the time of trial" People v. Porrata, 613 N.E.2d 1212,1221 (111. App.
1993); see also Robertson v. State, 319 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1974) ("It is proper to show
Defendant had changed his appearance since the alleged crime."); cf. Commonwealth v.
Frazier, 480 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super 1984) (concluding that reference to defendant as
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"dressed like he's out of Gentlemen's Quarterly" was not improper and, even if improper,
was not prejudicial).
This principle is a natural extension of the rule generally accepted in Utah that
"c[i]f [a defendant] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense[,] his credibility may
be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness.'" State v.
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (brackets in original) (quoting Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958)); see also State v. Hansen, 22 Utah 2d 63,
448 P.2d 720, 721 (Utah 1968). Thus, the State may introduce and comment on "any
testimony or evidence 'which would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt upon the
credibility of [a defendant's] testimony.'" State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479,482 (Utah App.
1991) (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Green, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1978)).
Finally, "Utah law affords trial attorneys considerable latitude in closing
arguments." Cummins, 839 P.2d at 852. "Counsel for both sides have a 'right to discuss
fully from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom.'" Id. at 842-43 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)).
They also have the right, "during closing arguments, [to] comment on the credibility of
witnesses." Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 (quoting Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15).
In light of these legal principles, the statements that defendant challenges on
appeal do not constitute improper comment on defendant's right to appear at trial in a
"garb of innocence."
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The State's first comment was:
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and his
credibility as to the events, you have had a chance to see not
only the defendant in this courtroom today and this week with
how he presents himself, with how he packages himself in
appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor,
in temper or lack thereof, you have seen him in every one of
those aspects on [the 7-Eleven surveillance tape recorded]
October 20th, 1996. Is this an honest packaging?
(R. 345:659; Add. G). Clearly, the purpose of this statement was not to ask the jury to
draw certain inferences concerning defendant's credibility based on his "garb of
innocense," but to contrast defendant's appearance and demeanor at the time of the
shooting with his appearance and demeanor at the time of trial. As the State reiterated
later in its argument, "Realize the packaging today as it is today and as it was then" (R.
345:666; Add. G).
"The prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." State v. Chess, 617 P.2d
341, 344 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f4; 999 P.2d 1. Thus, a
criminal defendant has the "right... to be tried in front of a jury in the 'garb of
innocense,' rather than in prison clothing." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah
App. 1991). However, this does not mean that the State must provide defendant with an
"expensive wardrobe." Chess, 617 P.2d at 345. Rather, it means only that, unless
defendant specifically chooses otherwise, defendant has a right to appear in "civilian
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clothing," Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at %L\,—"clean, respectable clothes, not identifiable as
peculiarly prison clothes." Chess, 617 P.2d 345.
Defendant's right to appear in the "garb of innocence," then, is not a right to
appear at trial in a suit and tie. See Chess, 617 P.2d at 345. Rather, defendant only has a
right in civilian clothes. Id. He thus could have appeared at trial in clothing similar to
what he was wearing on October 20, 1996. He chose not to, opting instead to "clean up"
his appearance.
Because defendant testified at his trial, the State could properly comment on this
change. See Porrata, 613 N.E.2d at 1221; Robertson, 319.N.E.2d at 836; Frazier, 480
A.2d at 280. The State's comment in no way detracted from defendant's right to appear
at trial in the "garb of innocence." It did not, as defendant suggests, imply that defendant
was incredible because he was not wearing prison clothing. Rather, it only suggested
what the jury could reasonably infer concerning defendant's credibility based on his
changed image. See Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green, 578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448
P.2d at 721; Baker, 963 P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at
482. The State "[has] the right to discuss 'fully from [its] standpoint] the evidence and
the inferences and deductions arising therefrom.'" See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 842-43
(citation omitted).
The State's second statement was also proper.
But you have —and I recall—I want you to recall Mr.
Shapiro's opening statement, and he was talking about the
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newly—the couple, not newly married couple, but the couple,
they had gotten their child a baby-sitter and they were able to
go out for this date. Just your average couple. And on the
other hand we had the drunken rowdy trouble making boxers
cruising for trouble.
(R. 445:659-660; Add. G). Here, the State asked the jury to consider whether defendant's
and Rios's appearances at the time of the shooting supported defendant's portrayal at trial
of himself and Rios at the time of the shooting—that he was an innocent victim and Rios,
a drunken trouble-maker. "Is either one of those portrayals honest now that you know the
situation? Or is it part of the packaging?" (R. 445:660; Add. G).
Again, nothing in the State's comment suggests that defendant should have worn
prison clothing during the trial or that he was incredible because he did not. Indeed, the
comment did not even refer to defendant's appearance at trial. Rather the comment only
asked the jury to consider whether defendant's appearance on the 7-Eleven surveillance
tape was consistent with his claim that he was an innocent victim acting in self-defense,
and whether Rios's appearance on the tape was consistent with defendant's claim that
Rios was a drunk and rowdy trouble-maker. The State was thus only discussing from its
standpoint the evidence and inferences concerning the witnesses' credibility arising
therefrom. See Cummins, 839 P.2d at 842-43; see also Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green,
578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448 P.2d at 721; Baker, 963 P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at
854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at 482..
Although the State did comment on Rios's appearance in chains in between the
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two comments discussed above (R. 345:659-60; Add. G), the Rios comment did not raise
the inference, as defendant claims, that defendant should have also appeared in chains.
Rather, the State's comment merely asserted that Rios's appearance in chains was
consistent with the violent criminal history he himself had testified to at trial (R. 345:65657). To the extent that statement related at all to the other two, it did not suggest a
comparison of Rios's appearance at trial with defendant's appearance at trial; rather, it
suggested only that Rios's appearance was consistent with his testimony and that
defendant's was not. There was nothing improper about this or the other comments. See
Winward, 941 P.2d at 634; Green, 578 P.2d at 514; Hansen, 448 P.2d at 721; Baker, 963
P.2d at 804; Cummins, 839 P.2d at 854 n.15; Reed, 820 P.2d at 482.
The larger context in which the statements were made confirms this conclusion.
See Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 (holding that appellate court must consider statement in
context). The State opened this section of its argument with the statement that "[t]here are
reasons to believe and not to believe witnesses" (R. 345:656; Add. G). The State first
discussed the evidence relative to Rios's credibility (R. 345:656-57; Add. G). It then
moved on to discuss the credibility of the Jiminezes (R. 345:657; Add. G). It began with
their "extremely selective memory" (Id.). It next moved to issues concerning defendant's
appearance, including the comments challenged here (R. R. 345:659-60; Add. G). It then
discussed the testimony of defendant's medical expert and whether that testimony was
consistent with Rios's testimony or the 7-Eleven video of the crime (R. 345:660-62; Add.
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G). In conclusion, the State asked the jury "to view the deportment of both the defendant
and his wife on the stand," (R. 345:664; Add. G), and to "[r]ealize the packaging today as
it is today and as it was then," (R. 345:666; Add. G).
The State's comments on defendant's credibility span eleven (11) pages of
transcript (Add. G). The only reference to Rios in chains is that upon which defendant
rests his misconduct claim. Neither alone or in context did that reference call on the jury
to compare Rios's appearance in chains with defendant's appearance in a suit.
Defendant's assertion, then, that the State called to the jurors' attention a matter which it
would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict, fails.
Moreover, even if a juror were able to discern in the prosecutor's statements the
implication that defendant now sees there, defendant has not shown that the effect of the
comment was so substantial and prejudicial as to require a new trial. First, although
defendant's trial counsel immediately objected to several comments during the State's
rebuttal argument (R. 345:688, 692, 696), it did not do so to the Rios comment (R.
345:659-60). Thus, trial counsel did not initially find the phrase objectionable or
understand the comment to be anything other than fair comment on witnesses' credibility.
Second, it is extremely unlikely that the jury would have understood the comment as
asking it to compare Rios's appearance in chains with defendant's appearance in a suit.
See, e.g., Reed, 2000 UT 68 at f l 9 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where "it is
extremely unlikely that the jury drew the inference [defendant] describes").

37

Third, the comment was the only one like it in 26 pages of closing argument. See
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 274 (Utah 1998) (holding no prejudice where single statement,
made in the course of a long trial, was not relied upon or referred to again by the
prosecutor); Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536 ((holding that frequency of comment is relevant in
determining prejudice); Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297 (same). Finally, as discussed above,
see pp. 23-22 supra, the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts in this case was
substantial. Cf. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988) (holding "fact that the
jury acquitted defendant of two of the four charges indicates that the verdict was a result
of a reasoned application of the law, rather than prejudice engendered by the improper
evidence.").
Thus, under the circumstances of this particular case, there is no reasonable
likelihood that, absent the challenged comment, the jury would have found in favor of
defendant. Cf. Wright, 893 P.2d at 1119 (rejecting claim that prosecutor's statement that
"'the performance that you saw from the defendant on the witness stand was utterly
incredible'" was prejudicial "in light of the totality of the evidence").
III.

THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE
BECAUSE THERE WERE NOT NUMEROUS ERRORS AND ANY
ERRORS COMMITTED WERE SO MINOR AS TO NOT HAVE
INFLUENCED THE OUTCOME
Defendant next claims that there were so many errors in his trial that even if no

single error undermined confidence in the verdict, their cumulative effect was sufficient
to do so. Br. Aplt. at 33. The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal "only if the
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cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was
had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted); State v.
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997), affirmed by 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998).
Although defendant has alleged several errors, as explained above, he has not
established that any substantial errors were committed that could collectively result in any
harm to him. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). Defendant asserts
that any errors were likely to affect the outcome because the State's case against him was
weak. Br. Aplt. 33. However, as discussed above, the State's case against defendant was
sufficiently strong that, even if none of the alleged errors^had occurred, the jury would
have convicted him.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED (f_ November 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
KARENA.KLUCZNIlJ
Assistant Attorney General
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1

MR. FINLAYSON:

2I photographs.
3

It's my understanding that the State is

not planning on --

4
5

There is gruesome

MR. LEMCKE:

We'll be submitting the drawings

of the medical examiner, Your Honor, only.

The only

6 1 reason we would ever bring in photographs is if
7

counsel announces that he is going to bring in a

8I ballistics expert.

If he is going to try to say it

9 1 was not Mr. Jimenez but the stranger on the grassy
10

knoll and the photographs are somehow necessary to

111 prove that, we might use them.
12
13I
14

But I think that is so

remote -MR. FINLAYSONs

And we are not planning on

doing that.

15

MR. LEMCKEt

16

THE COURT:

We are not going to do that.
All right.

With that

17

understanding, I will grant the motion.

18

unexpected occurs --

19

MR. LEMCKE s

20

THE COURTs

21

Yeah.
It would have to be reviewed at

that time.

22

MR. FINLAYSONi

23

THE COURTs

24
25

If anything

Right.

I will grant the motion.

What about to suppress the evidence of prior
convictions?

MR. LEMCKE:

1

Your Honor, the prior

2

convictions the defendant has -- actually, I don't

3

think there are any relevant ones that are within the

4

period.
He has had some involvement with drug

5
6

dealing.

7

aggravated assault w ith a knife.

8

resisting arrest.

9
10

There is one that was a failed to file, an

THE COURT:
MR. LEMCKE:

He has had a

No felonies?
Forged government document which

11

I see was a driver's license or something.

12

see how those would come in unless we are going to say

13

that, you know, he i s going to bring in his character

14

for being a peaceabl e person in the furtherance of a

15

self-defense claim which we would then, of course, be

16

able to bring in a lot of things in terms of even bad

17

acts, not just convi ctions.

18
19

THE COURT:

So far as your case in chief,

you're willing to submit or stipulate to this motion?

20

MR. LEMCKEx

21

THS COURT:

22

MR. FINLAYSON:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FINLAYSON:

25

I don't

Oh, yeah.
Is that satisfactory?
It is, Your Honor.

Okay.
And the only other motion

that I see right now coming up is that I talked to
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1

there's fertile enough ground without worrying about

2

that one, as it turns out.

3

MR.

LEMCKB:

We would ask though that the

4

def endant personally waive any objection he may have

5

to this particular fact.

6

a p ersonal right to him.

7

THB COURT:

Because that, you know, is

Okay.

Well, I guess,

8

Mr. Jlmlnez, the -- your attorney once represented

9

one of the State's witnesses in a criminal case.

10

I 'm not sure if that poses much of a conflict to you

11

or from your interests.

12

obj ectl on if Mr. Shapiro continues as your attorney?

13

MR. JIMINBZ*

14

THB COURT:

15

MR. JIMINKZ:

16

THB COURT:

17
18
19
20

But do you have any

I don't.
Okay.

Yeah, it's okay.
Apparently Mr. Jiminez has

agreed then and there will be no problem.
Then there were other motions we needed to
put on the record?
MR.

LEMCKB:

Yes, your Honor.

Before there

21

was the change of judge from Judge Noel to you due

22

to the structural constraints of the court --

23

THB COURT:

24

MR.

25

i

LEMCKB:

Right.

-- there were a number of

motions that were put before Judge Noel and ruled

168

And it would be our, I believe joint

upon by him.

motion, that each of those has now been put before
you in writt<an form <and that you would essentially
rule as Judg<a Noel hisis, nunc pro tunc, to preserve
the record.
MR.

FINLAY30N:

That's correct, your Honor,

and I think we filed a written motion to review
those record!3.
THE COURT:
MR.

The motion was filed yesterday.

FINLAYSON:

THE COURT:

Those motions.

One was a motion in limine to

allow statements of an unavailable witness.

As I

understand, Judge Noel sustained or granted the
objection to that -- to the testimony of those
unavailable witnesses; is that correct?
MR.

LEMCKB:

He did.

And then we agreed by

stipulation 1that the entirety of a videotape could
be played, but not an edited version.
THE COURT:

So I won't change or alter

Judge Noel's ruling in any way.

I will rule that

those -- that tape iii inadmissible*

However, I

understand the State will agree to its admissibility
in any event so long as the entire tape is played.
MR.

LEMCKE:

THE COURT:

That is correct, your Honor.
And then there was a motion in

1

limine to exclude gang references.

Is that a motion

to exclude gang references as to all witnesses, both
State and defense?
MR.

LEMCKE:

MR.

FINLAY30N:

We would hope so.
Yes, your Honor, unless

some witness puts that at issue.
THE COURT:

But at this point Judge Noel

granted a motion in limine to exclude all gang
reverences?
MR.

FINLAY30N:

All gang references.

There

is -- we do have some information on Mr. Rios.

We

asked him at the preliminary hearing whether he was
ever involved in gangs, he said no.

We do have some

information that he was involved in gangs.

So that

would actually go to credibility, that being an
issue there.
MR.

LEMCKE:

Well, it's still a gang

reference, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, I didn't hear the motion,

but -- who brought the motion in limine?
MR. FINLAYSON:

We brought the motion in

limine because the State had some photographs of
Mr. Jimines and had some information that he may
have been involved in gangs in California.

So we

brought the motion in limine to -- so that no gang

reference -- it actually was brought on behalf of
our client.

At the preliminary everybody said, all

the witnesses said they had no gang involvement.
And in Mr. Rios 1 statements to corrections people he
indicated that he was involved in a gang.

So that

j

is a -THE COURT:

Judge Noel did.

Well, I'll rule the same as

And that would be to exclude all

gang references at this point.

I suppose -- I mean,

that was his ruling, as I understand it?
MR.

LEMCKB:

MR.

FINLAYSON:

THE COURT:

It was, your Honor.
That was his ruling.

Okay, I won't change that in

any way.
Then there was a third motion in limine, I
suppose a defense motion to exclude gruesome
paragraphs*
MR.

LEMCKB:

THE COURT:

And we have none to show.
And that motion was granted by

Judge Noel.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

THE COURT:

It was, Your Honor.

Are there any photos that the

defense is aware of that you would characterize as
gruesome that you think the State is going to -MR.

FINLAYSON:

I don't think any autopsy

1

1

photos are coming in.

2

concerned with.

3

blood on the street and that's -- we just can't get

4

around that.

6

You know, some of the photos have

So we're not objecting to those.

THE COURT:

5

Those are what we were

Those are not gruesome photos

for purposes of that proceeding?
MR. FINLAYSON:

7

I don't think they qualify

8 I as gruesome photos.
THE COURT:

9
10

And apparently one of the

parties brought a motion to suppress prior

111 convictions*
12 I
13

MR. FINLAYSON:

limine that there shouldn't be any 609 evidence out

14 I there on our client.
15

And I think that was

stipulated to as well.
THE COURT:

16
17

Okay.

And Judge Noel granted

that motion?

18I

MR. FINLAY3ON:

19

THE COURT:

20

We brought that motion in

Granted that.

Suppress evidence of prior

convictions as far as Mr. Jiminez is concerned?

21

MR.

FINLAYSON:

22

THE COURT:

Right.

Okay, I'll rule the same as

23

Judge Noel.

I'll grant the motion in limine to

24

prohibit the use of a videotape of an interview of

25

Mr. Rios.

Is --
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1

MR. LEMCKE:

2

THE COURT:

3

Mr. Montoya,
Or Montoya then.

Except so far

as the State Intends to stipulate to Its

4 1 admissibility.

I'll grant as well Judge Noel's

5 1 ruling or confirm Judge Noel's ruling on a motion in
6 1 limine to exclude all gang references.
7I
8

I'll rule the same as he did on the
defendant's motion in limine to exclude gruesome

9 1 photographs*
10

And note the conclusion of the Court

that that does not preclude the use of crime scene

111 photographs that may show some blood.
12 I
13

And I'll rule as Judge Noel did on the
motion in limine to suppress evidence of

14 1 Mr. Jiminei' prior convictions*
15

Okay, anything else?

16 1

MR. LEMCKE: Yes, your Honor.

The State

17

has a motion at this time based on the opening

18

statement of Mr* Shapiro, and as you'll recall

19

Mr. Shapiro proffered to the jury in the opening

20

statement that what the defendant did in this case

21

in killing Mr* Miera and shooting at Mr. Montoya and

22I Mr. Rios went beyond self-defense.

It went beyond

23

defense of others*

It went to, in fact, the safety

24

of wife and children*

25

family and it is what any man would do.

It went to the defense of the
And we feel

that this has called the defendant's character into
issue in this case.
THE COURT:

MR. LEMCKE:

And you --

And if, in fact, this is going

to come back with a closing argument that a man, you
know, kind of the John Wayne, Jimmy Stewart, a man
must do what a man must do to protect the women and
children, that these are character issues, and from
that point if these are raised we are entitled to
examine the defendant's character in full.
THE COURT:

Now, qualify - - o r explain a

little better the second part of what you just said.
If they are raised, you said something -MR. LEMCKE:

Well, actually, we believe it

has been raised already by -- brought into issue in
this.

Although it wouldn't go in the case in chief,

nonetheless were the defendant to testify that, you
know, this is -- a man has to do this to protect his
family sort of thing, because clearly you will see
from the videotape and other things that the
defendant was not - - o r the wife of the defendant
clearly was not in imminent danger from either the
person who was being shot or the two people that
were running away.
That to go to this as some kind of a

17

character thing and he -- what a man must do, puts
character on the plate and at that particular point
we're entitled to start examining those issues and
the defendant's character and counter that.
THE COURT:

Let me say this at this p oint,

because I'm not sure the motion is yet ripe, I •11
listen to the testimony of Mr. Jiminez and the other
defense witnesses and if in my judgment Mr. Jiminez
has placed his character at issue, testifying or
having someone else testify that he's got a
reputation in the community for being a piece- loving
man or by nature he's a peaceable person or
something like that, clearly the State would b e
entitled to rebut.
Okay, so I'll take the motion under
advisement.

One other thing I wanted to point out

and put on the record, last evening, just prior to
our recess and after the jury was excused, the State
objected to the use of two defense expert witn esses,
one a doctor -- remind him of his name.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

THE COURT:

Rothfeder.

Rothfeder.

And a Mr. -- help

me again.
MR.

SHAPIRO:

THE COURT:

Moyes.

Moyes.

I would overrule the

1
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1

JOSE MARIO JIMINEZ,

2

called by the defendant, having been duly

3I

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

4
THE CLERK:

5

You do solemnly swear that the

6

testimony you are about to give in the case now

7

before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth

8

and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

9

Yes, I do.

10 1

THE CLERK:

Ill

MR. LEMCKE:

12

THE COURT:

13 1

(Side-bar conference.)

14

THE COURT:

15

(Examination conducted through an

16 1

Be seated up here, please.
Your Honor, may we approach?
Yes.

Go ahead, Counsel.

interpreter.)

17
18
19

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSONt
Q

20
21

Okay, Jose, will you tell us your name and

date of birth?

22

A

(In English)

23

Q

When were you born?

24

A

(In English)

25

Jose Mario Jiminez.

My date of birth is -- excuse

me?

36

Q

When were you born?

A

(In English)

Q

Okay.

May 1st, 1973.

Now, the State has your date of

birth wrong, don't they?
A

(In English)

Q

And do you remember correcting that with

Yes.

the judge at the preliminary hearing?
A

(In English)

Yes.

Q

And telling the judge that it was May 1st,

1973?
A

(In English)

Q

Okay.

Yes.

We're just going to talk briefly

about something that happened to you sometime ago.
Do youi remember an incident that happened a few
years back in California?
A
Q

A

(In English)

Yes.

Where were you living?
(In English)

I was living in almost

downtown Loi Angeles.

0

And what was your address there?

A

(In English)

Q

Do you remember the --

A

(In English)

Q

Caatralia?

A

(In English)

Dose Tre Avenue.

1953 Castralia.

Castralia, yeah.

3

0

Was there an occasion that something

happened to you in that - - a t

that address in

California?
A

(In English)

Yes.

Q

Or close to that address in California?

A

(In English)

Q

And what happened?

A

(In English)

Yes.

I got robbed and --

(Through Interpreter)

(In English)

And they hit me.

They hit me a lot.

And based on that did you have to go to the

Q

hospitalL?
A
Q

(In English)

Yes.

When you went to the hospital, do you know

how you -- how you were taken to the hospital?
A

(In English)

Q

By the ambulance?

A

(In English)

Q

And did they treat you at the hospital?

A

(In English)

By the ambulance.

Yes.

Yes.

MR* LEMCKE: Objection, leading, your
Honor.
THE COURT:

I don't believe it's leading.

I'll overrule the objection.
Q

(BY MR. FINLAY3ON)

Did they treat your

365

wounds ?
A

(In English)

Q

Now, I noticed you have a scar on your

head, <Dkay.

Yes, they did.

It's obvious.

j

What did you get that

scar £:rom?
A

(In English)

That's a problem.

(Through the Interpreter)

From that

problem.
Q

And do you know what happened to your head?

A

(In English)

I just remember they took me

to the hospital.

0

Okay.

When you went to the hospital by

ambulance, what name did you use?
A

(In English)

Q

Now, Antonio Sanchez isn't your real name,

Antonio Sanchez.

Is it?
A

(In English)

Q

Why did you use the name Antonio Sanchez?

A

(In English)

No.

Because I didn't have money

to pay the bills.
Q

So you lied to the hospital?

A

(In English)

Q

Because you didn't have money?

A

(In English)
MR. LEMCKB:

Yeah.

Yes.
Objection, leading, your

36

Honor.
MR. FINLAYSON:

I believe that's what he

said.
THE COURT:

It is.

It would have been

leading, but I'll overrule the objection.

He's

answered the question.
MR. FINLAYSON:

If I could have just one

moment, your Honor.
Your Honor, if I could have these marked.
THE COURT:

That will be Defendant's

Exhibit 11; is that correct?
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q

Defendant's Exhibit 11.

(BY MR. FINLAYSON)

Mr.

Jiminex, do you

read English?
A

(In English)

Q

Kind of.

Kind of.

Okay, I have here what purports

to be some medical records ~A

(In English)

Okay.

Q

-- sent to our office.

Would you indicate

to us the name on the medical records here.
A

(In English)

0

Okay.

Antonio Sanchez.

Now, is that the name that you used

at the hospital?
A

(In English)

Yes.

Yes.

Q

Now, it has an admit date, what's the admit
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date on those?
A

(In English)

The 8th of 7, 1994.

Q

And an admit time of 11:56 at night.

Does

that sound right?
A

(In English)

Yes.

Q

And what's the date of birth?

A

(In English)

Q

Now, you haven't had a chance to look at

It's May 1st, '73.

these medical records, have you?
A

(In English)

No.

0

There's a patient transfer acknowledgment

on the third page of these records.

Do you see

where it says the patient's signature?
A

(In English)

It says Antonio Sanchez.

0

Okay.

A

(In English)

Q

And do you remember signing that patient

Is that your signature?
Yeah.

transfer acknowledgment?

I think so.

You may have been a little

dazed, huh?
A

(In English)

I don't remember.

Q

And the physician certificate transfer,

there's another signature there, right?
A

(In English)

Yeah.

Q

You had a broken arm?

A

(In English)

Yeah, two.

3

Q

So you had to sign with a broken arm?

A

(In English)
MR.

Yes.

FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, that's all the

questions I have of Mr. Jiminez at this point.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Cross-examination on

that -- those points?
MR. LEMCKB:

Very briefly, your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEMCKB:
Q

So Mr. Jiminez, you admit you lied to the

people who were providing you the medical care?
A

(In English)

Yes.

Q

And you used the name, what, Carlos

Sanchez?
A

(In English)

Antonio Sanchez.

0

These aren't the only other false names

that you've used, are they?
MR. FINLAYSON:
at this point*

Judge, I'm going to object

Can we approach?

THE COURT:

Yes.

(Side-bar conference.)
Q

(BY MR. LEMCKB)

So Mr. Sanchez -- excuse

me, Jiminez, on this occasion you have not reviewed
these records that are contained in the exhibit?
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A
Q

(In English)

No.

No, sir.

And other than the two signatures you claim

are yours, you have no way of knowing If these are,
In fact , the records from California from these
people that you lied to about who you were.
A

(Through the Interpreter)

I remember I was

taken to the hospital.
Q

Okay.

But the question is, sir, do you

know if these are, in fact, your records?
A

(Through the interpreter)

From what :Lt's

been shown, yes.
Q

What is it that tells you that this bunch

i«, in fact, your records?
A

(In English)

The name and --

(Thorough the Interpreter)

The results and

the blows that it shows in there.
0

The results that it shows in there?

A

Yes.

Q

So you have reviewed them?

I thought you

told us you had not*
A

(In English)

Until right now I said tbhat

because- I told -- I warn -(Thorough the Interpreter)

I had a -<- how

do you say it, a surgery.
Q

All right.

So if these show surgery, they
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1

might be yours?

2

A

(In English)

3

Q

You say they robbed you or they beat you.

4

Yes.

Who are they?

51

A

(In English)

6 1 don't know.
Q

7

Three or four people.

I

I didn't know them.

So you -- whatever it was you were in an

8 1 incident, a violet incident with three or four other
9

people on that occasion?

10

A

(In English)

Oh, there was three or four

111 people who came to me, robbed me.
Q

12I

Is there a police report that accompanies

13

that?

14

A

(In English)

15

Q

Have you brought that police report with

17I

A

(In English)

18

Q

You don't know?

19

A

(The witness nods in the negative.)

20

Q

Did you tell the police your correct name?

21

A

(In English)

22

Q

Did you ever talk to the police about these

16

Yes.

you?
No, sir.

I don't know.

I don't remember.

23

three or four people that you were involved with and

24

the violet incident?

25I

A

(In English)

I did.

Q

But you don't know if you told the police

your correct name?
A

(In English)
MR. LEMCKE:
THE COURT:

I don't remember.
Nothing further, your Honor,
Anything else?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q

Just one thing.

What were you hit with in

this incident, Mr. Jiminez?
A

(Through the Interpreter)

With clubs.

The

ones they use to secure automobiles.
MR. FINLAYSON:

All right.

That's all I

have, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. LEMCKE:
THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Lemcke?
No, your Honor.
Okay, then you may step down,

sir.
And I assume then we're through with

--at

this point the defense doesn't have its next witness
available and won't until tomorrow; is that correct?
MR. FINLAYSON:

Tomorrow morning at 9:00,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

So we'll excuse the jury again

at this point until about, let's say, 9:00

o'clock
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THE COURT:

Good morning.

For the record,

the members of the jury are present and counsel and
parties are all present, and X assume prepared to go
forward this morning.
Is there anything, Counsel, before we ask
the defendant to call its next witness?
MR. LBMCKE: Not that the State's aware of,
your Honor.
MR.

FINLAY3ON:

THE COURT:

No, your H o n o r .

All right, I'll ask the defense

then to call its next witness.
MR. FINLAY30N:

Your Honor, we call

Dr. Robert Rothfeder.

ROBERT KEITH ROTHFEDER,
called by the defendant, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in the case now

3

during -- and the broken arm, the broken jaw, that
is the medical records from California, that is not
medical records out of this particular incident
where -A

That's correct.

Q

-- where Mr. Jiminez is punched by

Mr. Rios?
A

Correct.
MR. LEMCKS:

Could I have State's 1, your

Honor, the videotape?
Thank you.
Q

(BY MR. LEMCKS)

And have you been

provided any medical records from the defendant or
from counsel of the '96 incident where Mr. Rios
punched Mr. Jimines?
A

No, I've not.

Q

So he presented you no place where --

records from a place where he went to be treated?
A

I've not reviewed records from that

incident, that's correct.
Q

All right*

And he is, in fact, your

patient and these are his attorneys and they would
have access to those records if they, in fact,
existed?
A

I would assume that to be the case, yeah.

4

Q

And you would also assume they would

provide them to you?
A

I would*

Q

Okay.

And you went over a history with the

defendant, and other than what he told you about the
violent street incident that he was involved in, or
in counsel's words, purports to be involved in in
'94, and the incident that took place in "96, did he
give you any other history of violence that he has
had?
MR.

FINLAY3 ON:

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

Judge, can w e approach?

Sure.
I --

Before you answer, Doctor.
Okay.

Excuse me just a minute.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:
MR.

Q

LEMCKB:

1*11 overrule the objection.
All

right.

(BY MR. LEMCKE) Did the defendant give

you any other history of violence that he's been
involved in?
A

I didn't frame my question to him in those

terms, in terms of whether he was involved in
violence.

What I did ask was whether he'd had

40

significant previous illnesses or injuries.

And

with respect to injuries, I said I'm not really -I'm not really talking about, you know, cuts and
bruises and that type of thing, but serious, what
he'd consider serious injuries, and childhood or
adult.

And he did not give me any additional

history of serious trauma.
Q

So the only history he provided you then

was the "94 incident and the '96 incident?
A

That was the only positive response to that

question on previous trauma, correct.
Q

Okay.

And you are not a psychologist as

such?
A

As such, well --

Q

Or a psychiatrist?

A

A lot of what I do involves that, but

that's not what Z describe myself as, a
psychologist.

0

That's not your particular professional

area of expertise?
A

Correct.

Q

And you're not here to give an opinion on

extreme emotional disturbance, are you?
A

That's correct.

Q

And also you're not here to talk about

40
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NOEMI MONICA JIMINEZ,
called by the defendant, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in the case now
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE CLERK:

Be seated up here, please.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Counsel.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Judge.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAPIRO:
0

Good morning, Ms. Jiminez.

Would you for

the record tell us your full name and spell your
last name.
A

Noemi Monica Jiminez, J-i-m-i-n-e-z.

Q

Okay.

We 1 re going to ask you to speak up

so that everybody can hear.

That microphone will

help a little bit, but please speak loud enough so
that everybody can hear.
Do you know the defendant?
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Q

You saw Mr. Rios punch your husband?

A

Yes •

Q

You saw your• husband come up with the gun?

A

Yes •

Q

Did you see your husband conceal that gun

in his clothing earli er that night?
A

No.

0

Did you know when you were at Me Mexico he

had a concealed gun on him?
A

No.

Q

Did you know that the concealed weapon

under that circumstance would be a crime in and of
itself?
MR.

FINLAYSON:

MR.

SHAPIRO:

Objection, your Honor.
Objection, your Honor.

May

we app roach?
MR.

LEMCKE:

And your Honor, might we have

on* P« rson do the obj ectlon?
THS

COURTS

Yes, just one at a time.

I

think we do need to designate one attorney to speak.
(Side-bar conference.)
THS

COURT:

MR.

SHAPIRO:

THE

COURT:

MR.

LEMCKE:

The objection la sustained.
May we approach again, Judge?
Yes.
May I be Invited In?

44

THE COURT:

Yea,

go

ahead.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

I'll overrule the objection --

or sustain the objection, excuse me.
Go ahead, Counsel.
MR. SHAPIRO:

We'd ask for the instruction

as well.
THE COURT:

There was no answer, but I'll

sustain the objection.
Q

(BY MR. LEMCKB)

So do you know when he

concealed that handgun in his clothing?
A

No.

Q

Had you ever seen your husband with a

concealed handgun before -A

No.

Q

- - o n other instances?

Me Mexico?

You closed the bar?

THE COURT:
Q

You closed the bar

Do you understand the question?

(BY MR. LEMCKM)

Were you there at the bar

until it closed?
A

Yes.

Q

Then you came to the 7-Eleven?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

You told us that the man in the car

was getting out of the car?
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1

straightforward with you, which witnesses told you

2

the truth.

3

defendant guilty of murder, guilty of attempted

4

murder, guilty of a second count of attempted

5

murder, and guilty in each of those three counts of

6

using a firearm in the commission of those acts.

7

Thank you.

That is why I believe you will find the

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. FINLAYSON:

10

Counsel for the defendant.
Your Honor, could we

approach briefly before?

11

THE COURT:

12

(Side-bar conference.)

13

THE COURT:

Yes.

All right, Counsel for the

14

defense, if you'd like to make your closing

15

statement.

16

MR. FINLAY3ON:

17

Try as I'm sure that you will, because I

18

know that you 1 re going to follow the law, you may

19

never be able to put yourself in the shoes of my

20

client that night,

21

of my client, as judging the facts and bringing back

22

a verdict on my client, the law is that -- and all

23

the law mentions, the circumstances arising here,

24

the law is that you must put yourself in the shoes

25

of my client in those same circumstances.

Thank you, your Honor.

But that's the law.

As judges
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reasonable people.

Anybody who might have

preconceptions or ideas that are far left, far
right, those -- we pick people that are not that
way.

We picked people who are going to be fair and

impartial.

You are reasonable people.

If you have any doubt that the State has
proved beyond any reasonable doubt that self-defense
took place, then you have to acquit.

And you need

not consider anything else because that acquits
Mr. Jiminez of every single count, of Count I,
homicide; Count II, attempted homicide; and Count
III, attempted homicide.

And that is the law in the

State of Utah and probably every state.

And the

reason is, is because you cannot be held responsible
for what happens when the use of dangerous force is
used when you're trying to defend yourself.
The State's case, because of that problem,
the State's case has been, the whole two days, the
State's case has been that it was improper for my
client to have a gun.

Now, in this country there is

a second amendment right to have a gun.

We have

rules about that, but there is all kinds of people
walking around with guns, with concealed weapon
permits, with concealed weapons.

Unfortunately

whether you agree with guns or you don't agree with
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1

guns, guns are all over in our society.

2
3

And this is not a case about whether it was
proper for Mr. Jiminez to have a gun or not.

4 1 is irrelevant.

That

Because whether it was proper for

5 1 him to have a gun or not when he walked up there, it
6 1 doesn't matter.
7

What matters is what happened in

those five or six seconds.

When he was clocked,

8I when he was -- went down, when he got up and was
9
10

disoriented, confused, not being able to make a
judgment call, he defended himself.

111 self-defense as Mr. Lemcke admitted.
12
13

possible?

Yes.

And that is
Was it

Not only possible, but likely.

If you'll indulge me a minute, there's a

14

couple of things I need to say about jury

15

instructions.

I hate to talk about jury

16 1 instructions because to tell you truth, it's boring.
17

But let me say a couple of things.

Mr. Lemcke left

18

out one major part of the self-defense instruction

19

when he told you what it was.

20

tried to put headings on them so you can find them

21

easier because I know these jury instructions are

22

complicated.

23

a -- when you're using the type of defense that's

24

intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily

25

injury, you only can use that if he or she

And I think we've

But self-defense, when you're using

Mr. Rios, he's been responsible for the
destruction of at least two lives and who knows how
many others he's influenced their lives.

And I

would ask you to not allow him to make my client the
next.

Thank you.
THE COURT:

for just a minute.

Thank you.

Now let me pause

Would it be appropriate at this

point to take another short recess?
Then Mr. Lemcke, I'll permit you to proceed
with your rebuttal.
MR. LEMCKB:

Thank you, your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we get a
chance to do what's called rebut.

Talk about what

the defense talks about in their closing.
Goodness sakes, I didn't watch the video
close enough to know that Manuel Rios shot Henry
Miera.

That Manuel Rios started the whole fight.

That Manuel Rios did this.

It's real easy to have a

guy like Manny and call him names and everything
like that.

I'm not going to present to you that

Manny is the guy you would want to date your
daughter or, you know, to have your sons go out and
on bar-hopping expeditious with at night.

But Manny

Rios, among other things, you tell me if he's a liar
or if Manny is just being Manny.

I tell you Manny
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1

something that would put you in fear for your life,

2

but I don't remember that now.

3

j

He says it's self-defense when defense --

4

self-defense is clearly not available.

5

extreme emotional distress, but it's not available

6

because it's from an act that he caused.

7

it's imperfect self-defense, but it's not even

8

self-defense to start with.

9

He says it's

He says

He wants to lay this off on everyone else.

10

He comes in and he says things like, again,

11

misquoting Mr. Montoya, well, Montoya told me there

12

was a fight at Shooters.

13

uses two phrases, scuffle and an incident, which I

14

contend are not necessarily fights.

15

characterized as a fight, again, simply to denigrate

16

people who can't defend themselves.

17

No, Montoya in the tape

But it's being

Again, Montoya never saw him pull --

18

said - - h e said pull the gun out and raised his

19

shirt.

20

irrelevant whether or not the defendant was entitled

21

to have the firearm.

22

talked about him going into something with a

23

concealed firearm because of his propensity to obey

24

or not to obey the law.

25

or not he could have one.

The idea that counsel told you, it was

We never got into that.

We

We didn't get into whether
Counsel talks about well,

69

there's the second amendment, there are permits.

No

evidence of whether anybody did or did not have
permits here.

I'm certain you would have heard

that.
What you have is in the early morning hours
of October 20th, 1996, Henry Dennis Miera, a person
nobody has said was involved in the altercation in
any way , dies from two gunshot wounds tracts that go
right through his body at the hand of the defendant
who comes into this thing and who brings the
concealed firearm into this and gets in everybody's
face because he knows he's got it.

And he pulls it

out, at which point the only self-defense that takes
place in this case is Manny Rios punching him so he
can get away from the gun.
Manny Rios, also not a perfect person.
There is no extreme emotional distress except what
the defendant brought on himself.

There is no

self-delCense because there's no imminent threat of
force.

This while he gets up and it's kind of

unsolicited, well, he's knock out, he gets up, he
sees them standing over him, he's confused, he
doesn't know what's going on, so he gets up and
defends himself.

No, they run away.

The time frame on the tape doesn't show
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Scott and juror Michael Ross.
this time.

You are excused at

You are not permitted to deliberate.

We

thank you for your service.
Again, it's an unfortunate thing to have to
do it, but you have helped us just by serving to
this p oint in the proceedings and we appreciate it.
If you 1 d like to remain, watch the final outcome,
you may do so.

But only those eight who are to

serve as jurors can deliberate on the case.

So

thank you.
1*11 ask those eight members to follow the
deputy into the jury room.
(The following proceedings were held in
open court out of the presence of the
jury*)
THB COURT:

You can be seated.

For the

record , Counsel, let me just ask, in fact, it was
Mr. Scott and Mr. Ross, isn't that correct, that
were the alternate jurors?
MR. LBMCKB:

As we understood, your Honor.

MR. FINLAY3OH:

That's the way we

unders tood it, your Honor.
THB COURT:

Okay, just so we're clear.

Counse 1 for the defendant, you indicated that you
wanted to make a motion for mistrial.
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The record should reflect the jury has been
excused and this would be an appropriate time to do
that.

Go ahead if you would like.
MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, during

counsel's opening part of his closing argument he
referenced the character of our defendant, accusing
us of packaging him as a Jimmy Stewart.

Talking

about Rios being in chains as he should be at the
prison and our client sitting out here in the suit
and glasses and comparing him to the video.

He's

not allowed to comment on the character of our
client.

It was never a point put at issue by us.

We approached the bench and objected to that.
THE COURT:

You

MR. FINLAYSON:

did.

And asked that there be a

mistrial•
We also took exception to - - we also take
exception to Mr. Lemcke's bringing up the concealed
weapon as showing our client's propensity to disobey
the law, which I think is exactly what all the
404(b) and 609 evidence is exactly trying to keep
out.

And that is trying to try Mr. Jiminez on the

merits and not on his propensity to disobey the law.
We would ask for a mistrial for that as well.
And that -- and I think I've made my
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objection clear on when Mr. Lemcke started into the
fact that the jury had not been dealt with in a
straightforward manner.

I think he -- that the jury

could take that and it is certainly reasonable for
them to take that that we were hiding something from
them or that I have done something improper in this
trial.

It's your Honor's province to decide whether

there's something improper going on and I take
exception to that.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Lemcke, your response to the motion for
a mistrial on those three ground?
MR.

LEMCKE:

Your Honor, first of all

there -THE COURT:
MR.

Pardon me.

LEMCKE:

There are three grounds and

the idea that: -- we talked about the deportment of
the defendant;, you know, here and there.

And that

those are different affects is proper comment on the
deportment of a witness.

The defendant did take the

stand in thia\ particular case.
clearly at issue.
credibility.

His credibility is

We, in fact, attacked his

In fact, the second - - o r the third

thing that counsel complains about is that we talked
about --
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THE COURT:

Being unfairly dealt with.

MR. LEMCKE:

Oh, that the jury was not

being dealt straightforward with.
THE COURT:

Or straightforward.

MR. LEMCKE:

And that is simply talking

about I don't think that the defendant and his wife
were telling them the truth.
on Mr,, Finlayson.

I was not commenting

If Mr. Finlayson has some ill at

ease with that, I apologize to him.
apologize for the process, though.

I do not even
Because I think

I'm entitled to comment on the defendant, as any
other witness, whether or not I believe he's telling
the truth.

And I think that so much of what he said

was transparently false and that is the comment on
that.
The other issue is -- deals with Manuel
Rios being in chains.
different time.

That was mentioned at a

To hear counsel's complaint it

would be, well, here is the defendant over here in a
suit, and here is Manuel in chains.
about Manuel a lot.

No, I talked

In fact, to comment in my

rebuttal, where counsel said, oh, he's an NFL
lineman, I said he's not an NFL lineman, he's a USP
inmate.

We've never sold him as a church warden.

We've only let Manuel be Manuel.
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And to somehow cobble together the comments
on Manuel as a backsided comment on the defendant, I
don't know if that shows something of the mind set
of counsel, It's more so than what happened actually
in court.

So I don't think that his comments are at

all well made.

And his motion for mistrial

certainly isn't.
THE COURT:

Did you want to comment on the

second ground?
MR.

LEMCKE:

THE COURT:

Which was?
The firearm,

the -- counsel

said -MR.

LEMCKE:

Oh, on the firearm.

The

problem with that was that in his close
Mr. Finlayson went into a speech about, well,
there's a second amendment.

We're not talking about

whether people are entitl.ed to have them or not,
there are permits.

They had nothing to do with the

case, the second amendment or people having permits.
We never got into that.
into that.

We weren't going to get

And I have a right to rebut and come

back and talk about we didn't talk about permits.
We talked about the fact that he concealed a weapon
and went into this.

And that he has, among other

things, a propensity for crime and aggression.

And
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that was, you know, clearly central to the issues of
this case.
So 1bo somehow come out as thi s is
everything that's said when I reference the
defendant is somehow 403 or 404(b), is fallacious.
I get to comment on the defendant as a witness and I
get to comment on the defendant as an actor.
that is what the issue is about.

And

And to simply

complain about everything that comes i n against
their client is violative and only the re to smear
him, just isn't true*
THE COURT:

Okay.

It's your motion,

Counsel.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

Nothing else on that.

I

guess I should -- I forgot to put one thing on the
record.

I'll submit those.
THE COURT:
MR.

Okay.

FINLAYSON:

But when we - - we did

approach the bench when Mr. Lemcke indicated that he
believed I'd miacharacterized the law.
THE COURT:
MR.

On aggravated assault.

FINLAYSON:

On aggravated assault.

And

I think I'd ask the Court to instruct them on the
statute of aggravated assault.

And Mr • Lemcke, I

don't remember what you asked for the judge to do.
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MR. LEMCKE:

Your Honor, I asked you

actually to do nothing.

Except, you know, I did not

object to you saying that the law of aggravated
assault was not a part of this case.

And that the

different counsels disagree on certain issues in
this, which is true.

Also it should be part of the

record that it was the defense who didn't want
aggravated assault instructed in this particular
manner.

The instructions say that they contain all

the law that's necessary and Mr. Finlayson chose to
go beyond the jury instructions to get into an issue
of law that we weren't -- that apparently they
weren't set up for.
THE COURT:

I guess we could just deal with

this last one, give the jury a supplemental
definition of aggravated assault, if you wanted to
do it.
MR. LEMCKE:

I would object, Your Honor.

MR. FINLAYSON:
THE COURT:

That's what I'd ask for.

But you wanted me to, as I

understand it, Mr. Finlayson, from our discussion
here, you wanted me to tell the jury that your
characterization of aggravated assault was correct,
and I wasn't prepared to do that.
MR. FINLAY30N:

No, I did ask the Court
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1

then to instruct them -- I'd rea<i off the statute is

2

what I had done to i nstruct them on serious bodily

3

injury and aggravate d assault because that's what I

4

had read off of.

5

MR.

LEMCKB:

But at that point, your Honor,

6

counsel said broken teeth constitute various bodily

7

injury under the law and that is absolutely

8

incorrect.

9

THE

COURT:

Counsel, I <appreciate what you

10

were both arguing at this time.

11

arguable whether or not that Mr. Jiminez was a

12

victim of an aggravated assault.

So I hesitate to

13

tell the jury that d efinitively.

So I guess my

14

question now is aggravated assauiLt has been

15

explained -- it's been relied on by the defense as

16

an explanation as to why they feel self-defense was

17

necessary.

18

jury in a brief instruction what aggravated assault

19

is and let them decide for themselves?

20
21

24
25

Wouldn't it be helpful to now tell the

MR.

LEMCKB:

THE

COURT:

And why would you feel that

MR.

LEMCKE:

Well, because, again, you

I wouldn't think so, your

Honor.

22
23

And it's at least

way?

know, it is not the statute, the law which was read,

but it is th<9 interpretation in the case law that
matters whether or not this idea of broken teeth
being serious bodily injury is there.
THE COURT:
MR.

LEMCKE:

Well, what we -Unless we want to start

reading the several cases that deal with this.
THE COURT:

No, my suggestion is that we

just define aggravated assault, nothing more.

Not

make any -- not instruct the jury as to whether
broken teeth are or are not -MR.

FINLAYSON:

That's what I would like.

your Honor.
MR.

LEMCKE:

And we would object to it.

We

think it's surplusage and we think that they've gone
into the jury box now, it's an invasion.
THE COURT:

invasion.

I'm not sure that it's an

I' 11 consider, It counsel, if you'd look

to draft the instruction having nothing more than
the elements of aggravated assault.

I'll take a

look and I'll take a look whether or not it's legal
at this point to add a supplemental instruction to
the jury.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Now, in terms of the motion for

mistrial, I'll deny it.

First of all, the comments
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of the prosecuting attorney explaining to the jury
that, in fact, Mr. Jiminez is not Jimmy Stewart, if
I've characterized his description truthfully, is in
my judgment not a comment on the character of
Mr. Jiminez.

Again in opening arguments and during

Mr. Jiminez 1 own testimony, the defendant

attempted

to present to the jury an appearance or an image of
what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention
was.

It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to

make an effort to contradict that image.

And in my

judgment, that's what Mr. Lemcke was trying to do.
On the second ground, commenting that I
believe something to do with the propensity to
violate the law as shown by carrying an illegal
firearm.

It's a touchy area, I grant, but on the

other hand the defense implied through its closing
argument that Mr. Jiminez had a second amendment
right to carry a firearm.
It didn't quite go that far, but said words
to the effect of to the jury that haven't they heard
about the second amendment.

The clear implication

is that the defendant has a constitutional right to
have this gun.

Apparently there's some evidence

that he doesn't have a constitutional right to have
a gun for various reasons.

Among them possibly

70

because he's an illegal alien.
The State didn't make that comment and, in
fact, couldn't have made that comment in my
judgment.
do so.

It would have been misconduct for them to

But to follow-up and explain as they do that

the issue is not so much that the defendant has a
constitutional right to have a gun, but as to what
the gun may show about his state of mind and who, in
fact, was the aggressor.

Which I think was the

essence of what the prosecutor was saying, and again
in my judgment is not prosecutorial misconduct.

And

I deny the motion for a mistrial on those grounds.
And thirdly, the prosecutor's statement
that he didn't feel that the jury was being dealt
with in a straightforward manner or an honest
manner, Mr. Finlayson, I think if counsel had said
that I think the prosecutor is lying to you

--or

the defense counsel, rather, is lying to you or
misrepresented something to you, I would agree.

But

his statements can be construed that the defendant
himself was lying or the defense witnesses were
lying and the jury wasn't being told the truth.

He

didn't accuse you personally of anything, and
therefore again it wouldn't be prosecutorial
misconduct in my judgement.

There is no reason to

7

declare a mistrial and so I won't.
But I'll consider submitting an aggravated
assault instruction if you can draw one up quickly.
And I'll try to take a look at the law to see if it
would be appropriate even though the jury has been
sent to the jury room to deliberate to add that
instruction at this point.
We'll be in recess.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

MR. LEMCKE:

Thank you.

And your Honor, before I'd

submit that I'd ask the Court to look at -- I
believe there's case law, it was Justice Zimmerman.
I can't remember the case, but he said that things
like broken fingers, broken noses and I believe
broken teeth do not arise to an aggravated assault
level.
THE COURT:

Your argument there is that by

law -- as a matter of law this couldn't be an
aggravated assault•
MR.

LEMCKE:

THE COURT:
jury that, Counsel.

Correct.

I'm not prepared to tell the
Let me just explain to them

what aggravated assault is and draw their own
conclusion.
MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, it appears that
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NOEMI MONICA JIMINEZ,
called by the defendant, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give In the case now
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE CLERK:

Be seated up here, please.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Counsel.

MR. SHAPIRO:

Thank you, Judge.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAPIRO:
Q

Good morning, Ms. Jlmlnez.

Would you for

the record tell us your full name and spell your
last name.
A

Noemi Monica Jlmlnez, J-i-m-i-n-e-z.

Q

Okay.

We're going to ask you to speak up

so that everybody can hear.

That microphone will

help a little bit, but please speak loud enough so
that everybody can hear.
Do you know the defendant?

430

Q

So you simply don't recall that?

A

I don't recall it.

Q

All right.

After your husband left Judy's,

when i s the next time you had contact with him?
A

That night.

0

Did you participate in concealing him from

the po lice for a period of time?
MR. SHAPIRO:

Objection, your Honor.

May

we app roach?
THE COURT:

Yes.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

I guess we'll have to take a

short recess for a period of time.

I apologize to

the ju ry but we'll have to take a short recess and
talk about something outside the hearing of the
jury.

So I'll ask the jury to follow the bailiff.

Attorneys remain, please.
(The following proceedings were held in
open court out of the presence of the
jury.)
THE COURT:

You can be seated.

Counsel,

there 1 s an objection to the question of the
prosecution's attorney as to what Ms. Jiminez may
have done to assist in hiding her husband.
MR.

LEMCKB:

All

right.

4

THE COURT:

The objection is that if

Ms. Jiminez admits helping to conceal him from the
law, then she committed a crime.

And by admitting

that crime would have -- should have the opportunity
to at least to be advised by counsel, separate
counsel, as to her right not to incriminate herself.
And then if she chooses, could exercise that Fifth
Amendment right.
MR. LEMCKE:

Your Honor, noting that the

witness has already confessed to one crime of hiding
the car, and we 1 re still within the statute of
limitations, and that is tampering with evidence,
we're kind of almost moot at this point on that
particular issue.

If she, in fact, wants to consult

counsel, come back and say that she either cares to
take the Fifth Amendment or she cares to testify,
that would be fine.

And the State, of course, would

have to go along with that.
But Z think that that is the option to this
particular question.

We may want to put that one on

reserve, bring her back say after lunch and have her
put that answer in.

But as the Court noted at the

bench, I can ask her about things she observed of
her husband concealing himself from the law for that
particular period of time.
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THE' COURT:

So if I understand what you're

saying, Mr. Lemcke, you'd be happy to proceed by
asking her what she observed Mr. Jiminez do?
MR.

LEMCKE:

THE ' COURT:

Yes.
And in your judgment that

wouldn 1 t be objectionable.

But if you were to ask

her what she herself did, the actions she may have
taken, that could possibly incriminate her and you
agree that s he should have the advice of independent
counsel, to advise her on that?
MR.

LEMCKE:

Right.

And I would just put

her on the s tend, say I'll withdraw the question
because» you have the right to talk to an attorney
before you answer that one, and then move on to
asking about what she observed her husband do.
THE COURT:

All right.

Does counsel for

the def ense have any objection to proceeding that
way?
MR.

SHAPIRO:

I have an objection to him

saying I'll withdraw that question because you have
a right; to counsel.

That simply gives it more

Importance than. It's entitled to.

I'd ask that that

question be stricken completely and that it be
rephrai ed.
The fact that Mr. Lemcke said that she's
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already admitted to something is further evidence
that what he's doing is wholly improper.

To ask her

to confess to a crime while she's on the stand
unrepresented is unconscionable.

To say now that

because she's already done it once, doing it twice
isn't a big deal is even worse.

That's

reprehensibly conduct I think as far as this case
goes.

And as far as our client is now concerned

certainly to questions about her participating in
the crime is completely

irrelevant.

If the question is what did she observe, I
think that's a proper question.

But if she's asked

to give -- if she's being asked to give information
that's incriminatory, that simply shouldn't be
allowed to happen.
THE COURT:

She's entitled to counsel.
She's entitled to counsel.

It's certainly relevant what she may have done.

How

she may have assisted her husband certainly would be
relevant.
said.

I don't agree with that part of what you

If she's going to admit to a crime or be

asked to admit to a crime in open court on the
record then of course she's entitled to be advised
by independent counsel and then make the choice as
to whether she wants to exercise her Fifth Amendment
right or not.

I would agree.

4

So Mr. Lemcke, rather than have you explain
that you're going withdraw the question because the
answer may incriminate the witness -MR. LEMCKE:

I'll just withdraw the

question.
THE COURT:

I'll just simply indicate to

the jury that I've sustained the objection for now.
And if you want to pursue another line of
questioning.

But I will permit you to ask her

whether she had the understanding Mr. Jiminez was
going to purportedly conceal himself.

Any objection

to that?
MR. LEMCKE:

Your Honor, one thing before

we bring the jury back in.

I'm getting, although

counsel wants to call me names and things, what I'm
getting right now, unconscionable and everything
else, I'm getting stereoed.

And this is

Mr. Shapiro's witness and Mr* Finlayson has to -you know, he can consult with Mr. Shapiro but we
can't have two people up and down objecting.

It's

too hard to keep track of and it's basically unfair.
THB COURT:

And I agree.

I think what

we'll have to do is designate one counsel to deal
with a particular witness.

And if there's

cross-examination that the counsel questioning that
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you, Mr. Lemcke, what evidence do you have that
Mr. Jiminez may have been involved in some violent
behavior except that he admitted to in Los Angeles
and that which is the subject of this lawsuit?
MR.

LEMCKE:

The entries on his rap sheet

that Inc!Lude things again as resisting arrest and
aggravated assault that would put him in violent
situations.

And again, what we're talking about,

you know,r iS the basis of the doctor's opinion and
Is not a question that was used.

So I don't think

we'd have to proffer it, but we will, we'll proffer
the entire FBI rap sheet.
THE COURT:

That's as much as I'll require.

Let1' s bring the jury back in and resume
then with the cross-examination of Miss Jlmlnez.
But please don't ask her whether she h erself did
anything that would have been illegal, simply what
she observed her husband do.
MR.

LEMCKE:

THE COURT:

All right.
Yes, Ms. Jlmlnez, let's have

•you retake your seat at the witness stand, please.
MR.

Judge, one ques tion before

SHAPIRO,

the jury comes?
THE COURT:
MR.

Sure.

SHAPIRO r

A lot of -- thi s line of
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questioning -THE COURT:

Do you want to approach the

bench?
MR.

SHAPIRO:

THE COURT:

Yes.
Bring

them in.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

jury is again back.

All right, for the record the

And we 've had our discussions.

And counsel for the State, I'll sustain the
objection that was made earlier by defense counsel
and ask you to move to a new li ne of questioning.
MR.

LEMCKE:

(BY

MR.

All

right , thank you, your

Honor.
Q

LEMCKE)

After that particular

morning of October 20th, 1996, 'what did you observe
your hue band do to conceal hims elf from the law over
the next year or so?
A
question
0

In what way?

I don't iunderstand the

•

All right, then let me break it down.

Did

you observe your husband concea 1 himself from arrest
or leave to avoid arrest after the killing of
Mr. Miera?
A

Yes.

Q

How long was he gone?
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witness objects to, then one of you can object, one
of you can address the objection.
MR. LEMCKE:

And if we're going to be

called to approach, could that rule be in effect as
well?
THE COURTs

Pardon?

MR. LEMCKE:

If we're going to be called to

approach the bench, could that rule be in effect as
well?
THE COURT:

The one attorney that's dealing

with that particular witness I would ask to approach
the bench, make objections, argue the objections.
MR. FINLAY3OH:
that.

We've been trying to do

It's a little bit hard when Mr. Lemcke asks

an improper question, we sort of react and jump up.
We do -- I do have a motion 1 need to make.
THE COURT:
injury is out.

Let's do that now while the

It makes sense to do that.
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ahead.
MR. PINLAYSON:

Your Honor, we're going it

make a mistrial motion at this point.
been a couple of problems.

There have

Mr. Lemcke at every

point in this trial before -- instead of before
asking a possibly improper question he blurts it
out.

Had -- we've had a problem today with

45

Mr. Lemcke telling Detective Chidester to play the
video over and over while Dr. Rothfeder is
testifying.
THE COURT:
that out a little.

Let me just ask you to flesh
Your objection was that

apparently the detective played the videotape,
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, continuously during the
cross-examination of Dr. Rothfeder?
MR. FINLAYSON:

Playing it and at

Mr. Lemcke's request doing that from our
understanding of Detective Chidester.

He do object

to that.
THE COURT:
noted and sustained.

Okay.

And that objection was

They were asked to discontinue

the conduct.
MR. FINLAY3ON:

Mr. Lemcke asked yesterday

when Mr. Jiminez was on the stand, you've used false
names before, holding a sheet of paper up.

We've

provided a case to your Honor, State versus Palmer
at 860 P2d 339, that indicates asking -- that the
simply manner of asking the question, and I think
the discussion starts on page 5, unsupported
innuendo is prosecutorial misconduct.

And actually

this case was reversed based on that.

And that's

what that was, your Honor, it was prosecutor

45

innuendo.
Mr. Lemcke does not have admissible
evidence to prove that, at least he didn't properly
to the Court.

And that is prosecutor misconduct

under Palmer.

We objected to that.

Your Honor had

him not further ask any questions about that until
we could provide you law on that.
clear that that's improper.

I think it's very

That it is prosecutor

innuendo and we would make a mistrial motion at this
point based on our client's Fifth, Eighth,
Fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution and based on the state constitution.
THE COURT:

All

MR. FINLAYSON:

right.

In addition to that, today

Mr. Lemcke, knowing that we had -- at the time that
we talked about that, we also talked about whether
or not Mr. Lemcke could talk to - - could ask any
questions about the fact that it was a crime to
conceal a weapon.

Your Honor hadn't ruled on that

yet and Mr. Lemcke on cross-examination of
Ms. Jiminex blurts out, You realize that concealing
a weapon is a crime, and having the weapon was a
crime.
MR. LEMCKB:

Actually, that's not true,

your Honor, I never got to that question.

45

MR. FINLAYSON:
improper question.

Regardless, that was an

There are -- it is improper

under 404(b) evidence, prior crime evidence.

We are

entitled to notice that that was going to be brought
up.

It was not charged conduct.

The State has no

purpose getting into uncharged conduct.

If they had

wanted to charge that, then they should have charged
it in the beginning and given us notice that they
were going to go into that.

It has no relevance to

the case whatsoever, other than to bash Mr. Jiminez'
character and Ms. Jiminez 1 character.
totally improper.

That's

It obviously has no probative

value whatsoever as to what happened in this
incident.
The fact that -- the question about where
the weapon was, I don't even think is relevant.

But

before this happened, the question whether it was
concealed, whether he walked up or not certainly has
some relevance and that was asked.

But to go on and

interject, you know, he's not even asking the
question, he's simply testifying, you are aware that
that's a crime, is improper and irrelevant and
prejudicial to our client.
Your Honor sustained our objection, but I
believe that we're getting -- that with the two
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problems that we've got so far, I don't think the
Court can instruct the jury to dis -- I think the
Court certainly could instruct them to disregard it,
but I don't think they can any longer.

I think that

there's been too many instances of that and I'll ask
you that based on his constitutional right to a fair
trial, his due process rights, that his right to -and to testify and not be asked questions such as
unsupported innuendo, those have been violated and
we would ask that you declare a mistrial.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And the prosecutor's

response?
MR. LBMCKS:

Well, your Honor, counsel has

presented the Palmer case this morning.

Going back

to the question on what happened yesterday when the
defendant was on the stand for the limited purpose
of introducing his medical records, or what counsel
says purport to be his medical records, he admitted
at that time that he used a false name and lied.

At

this point having the FBI rap sheet that lists his
other aliases that he's used, I asked him about
whether or not he has other -- ever used other false
names.
Now counsel gets up and objects and he says
that I need to have evidence to support that.

I
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have his FBI rap sheet.

I don't have evidence that

you could use for collateral impeachment were the
defendant to deny that.

But I do have the right

based on evidence to ask him that question.
As to what happened today when the doctor
was on the stand, I had the right to inquire about
the basis for his opinion and with the defendant
asking about two prior instances - - o r the defendant
telling the doctor about two prior instances of
violence he had been involved in, I inquired about
the rest.

Again, we had the fire storm.

But that's

proper to examine the basis.
When we had this witness, Miss Jiminez, on
the stand, as we still do, I asked her if she
knew •• or in fact, we went through the conduct, the
conduct which is criminal.

I asked her about having

the concealed gun, about this and that, I asked her
whether or not she knew that was a crime, that was
objected to, that wasn't answered.
But this is not improper questioning in
.terms of uncharged criminal conduct.

If Z would

have gone through and charged everything that could
have been charged here, two counts of concealing
evidence, interstate flight, being a restricted
person in possession of a firearm, having a
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concealed loaded firearm/

I would have heard howling

about, oh, you're just a terrible prosecutor,
overreaching, trying to charge everything.
conduct is part of this criminal episode.

The
The fact

that it is criminal doesn't mean we don't get to
inquire about it.
THE COURT:
Mr. Lemcke.

Let me stop you there,

I think most of what you said the

defense counsel would agree with.

They would agree

that the conduct itself may be a part of the
episode, it may be relevant, but it's a
characterization as illegal conduct.

How is that

relevant and how does that help the trier of fact
decide in this case whether the defendant is guilty
of the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide?
MR. LEMCKE:

It goes to that, your Honor,

because the defense has raised from opening
statement this contention of who was the aggressive
party.

Who was that.

The defendant illegally being

possessed of a firearm, the defendant criminally
concealing the firearm, the defendant going out into
the public, knowing that he was -- had others at an
advantage that they were unaware of.

It goes to

this entire question of aggressiveness and who was
the initial aggressor.

If, you know, if we even get

4

beyond the legality of it and let that go, the fact
that he has it and the fact that he has it concealed
and the fact that he goes out this way, goes to the
aggressive nature of the conduct.

i

And that's where

we are.
I'd also re fer the Court to the Palmer case
in subparagraph 5, where the prosecutorial
misconduct is the prosecutor asked the defendant
to -- about his gues tioning and his preparation with
his attorneys and sa id, he didn't tell you to face
the jury and tell yo u exactly what to say.
a complete innuendo question.

That is

That has nothing to

do with conduct.
When we are talking about the defendant's
conduct in getting a firearm that he's not entitled
to have because of his status, about concealing it,
about going out and then going and concealing the
evidence to this par ticular crime, they are relevant
to the crime.

We're talking about whether or not

they're illegal.

I think I agree probably isn't

relevant to this jury.
THS

COURT:

MR.

LEMCKB:

Okay.
But to say that this is the

Palmer case is just -- it just isn't true.
THE

COURT:

I think I understand.

Counsel,
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just briefly in response?
MR.

FINLAYOSN:

Just briefly, your Honor.

I'm sorry, I forgot the other objection and I'm glad
that Mr. Lemcke brings it up.

i

I objected when he

talked about did he tell you about any prior
violence that he was involved in with Dr. Rothfeder.
Again, it's the innuendo.

It is exactly innuendo,

every one of those three instances have been
innuendo.

One, you've used f<alse names before.

Now

I think for the record we nee<i Mr. Lemcke to proffer
to the Court what admissible <evidence he had for
those three innuendos, first the false -THE COURT:

Let me ask you about that

before I ask Mr. Lemcke to do anything.

I read the

Palmer case and just quickly skimmed it, but the
concern there, I'm looking at page 5, the right-hand
column, about the very middle of the column it says.
Generally it's error to ask an accused a question
that implies the existence of a prejudicial fact
unless the prosecution can prove the existence of
the fact.

Otherwise the only limit on the line of

questioning be with the prosecution's

imagination.

And then the last paragraph o f that sentence says,
Hence, we can conclude the prosecutor's questions
which imply in the culpatory facts that were
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unsupported by that would support error.

'

And I would agree with you and Mr. Lemcke
and rule that before you can ask questions that
would be prejudicial, you have to have evidence that
proves it.

But I think Mr. Lemcke's point is a good

one too, and that is that the question in this
particular case wasn't just a product of his
imagination because he has an FBI rap sheet that
shows that the defendant has used several aliases.
Now, according to the Palmer case, before
he can ask the defendant about that he has to have
the evidence that can prove the existence of the
fact.

And that would imply that he has to have

admissible evidence.

But we're not talking about a

case where Mr. Lemcke just fished something out of
the air that he pulled something from his
imagination in order to discredit the defendant.

Is

that fair?
MR!. FINLAYSON:

I haven't seen what he's

proffered or what he's -- there's been no proffer to
me or to the Court of what exactly he's looking at.
| He flashed some piece of paper that I haven't seen a
copy of it, that's what I'm saying.
need

I think we

- - o n those three instances we need to know

whether Mr. Lemcke does have admissible evidence.

I
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agree with you, if he had whatever he was sent by
the FBI as a rap sheet that may not be out of his
imagination, but I don't think this case is based on
imagination.

I think what they're saying is that --

that's one of the big problems with that is that
otherwise if they don't make some rule like that,
then you could just out of your imagination come up
with a great way of cross-examining somebody and
make him look really bad.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. FINLAYSON:
rule.

But it's certainly not the

The rule is that there has to be admissible

evidence before that can be asked.

And I ask that

that evidence be proffered to the Court on all three
of those instances,

Including prior -- whether he

has certified copies of prior violent convictions.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Did you have anything

else by way of response?
IfR. FIMLA Y3 ON :

THE COURT:

No .

Mr. Lemcke, did you have

.something you wanted to add?
MR. LEMCKE:

Well, your Honor, first of all

it would only apply to Mr. Jiminez because Palmer
applies to that, which is asking the accused.

In

terms of asking the doctor, that's the -- what data
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he had that goes to the basis of his opinion, that's
clearly a proper question.
We have instances of the defendant involved
in conduct and they're not convictions but they're
involved in conduct, one of them which was
originally charged as an aggravated assault with a
knife.

And when the doctor is talking about his

basis for his opinion of the condition of the
defendant's head because of prior violence done to
it, then what he knows about the prior violence done
to the defendant's head is proper basis for his
opinion.
In terms of what was asked to the defendant
yesterday, which is the only question in front of
us, I had some evidence, I had the FBI rap sheet.
Mr. Finlayson got that in his discovery.
that for a long time.

He's had

The fact that, you know, he

hadn't looked at it in a while is not my fault.

And

like I say, I had evidence upon which to ask the
question -THE COURT:
you, Counsel.

Does the -- let me interrupt

I'm sorry to interrupt.

MR. LEMCKE:

I did not have the collateral

evidence that would be required to impeach him.
THB COURT:

But does the FBI rap sheet list
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1

aliases for Mr. Jiminez?

2

MR.

LEMCKE:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. FINLAYOSN:

It d o e s .

Go ahead.

Anything else?

Well, no.

I've got -- I

5I don't know how many volumes of discover I've got on
6

It.

It's Irrelevant.

It's not admissible evidence.

7I An FBI rap sheet is not admissible evidence.
81

THE COURT:

9I

MR. FINLAYSON:

I agree.

And we already had -- I

10I mean, add to that the fact that you've ruled, we had
11

Judge Noel rule and then you ruled that no prior

12

crimes or anything of that such nature can come in

13

on my client.

And with those rulings he's getting

14 1 up and asking questions -- it may not be that he's
15

asking Mr. Jiminez while he's on the stand, instead

16 1 he's asking the doctor, has he told you about any
17

prior violence that's he's been involved in.

He's

18

up there asking his wife, don't you realize that's a

19

crime.

That's still innuendo against my client.

20I And so the Palmer case does apply to those.
It 1 s not just when our client is on the

21]
22I stand.
23

It's innuendo that involves our client that

make him look bad.

It still goes to the same thing.

24I He doesn't have had admissible evidence for any of
25

that.

And I think what I'm getting form Mr. Lemcke
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is he still doesn't think there's any problem with
that and we're going to have a continuing problem
where myself and Mr. Shapiro, I don't know how
Mr. Lemcke termed it, but a whirl wind where we jump
up and have to object.

The jury is sitting there

watching that, the question is out there, we don't
have any choice but to object because we waive the
whole issue if -- from the appellate court
standpoint if we don't.

And the jury sees us jump

up and object and Mr. Lemcke has everything he wants
right then.
up.

He has the innuendo.

He has us jumping

He has the jury looking at that and the jury

saying, wow, there's something that they don't want
us to know.
And regardless of whether you sustain our
objection or not, that innuendo is in there.

And

all of those occasions that's happened and
Mr. Lemcke even when he goes to ask her whether she
knows she was involved in concealing and that kind
of a crime, doesn't have the forthrightness to
before you ask that question inquire whether we have
a Fifth Amendment issue with our client, with our
witness•
There are states that make that an ethical
rule that you can't ask a question that you have
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1

some knowledge will respond in a Fifth Amendment

2

right without bringing that up to the Court.

3

should have been brought up to the Court.

That

And this

4 1 is over and over happening again and it's getting to
5

the point where the jury is thinking that all of our

6

witnesses have something wrong with them.

And we - -

7 1 we're trying to hide something.
8

MR. LEMCKE:

9

MR. FINLAYSON:

10

Your Honor -I can't -- there's no way

the Court and there's no way I can fix that problem.
THE COURTS

11

Okay.

Well, I think I

12

understand and I'm ready to rule.

It's the

13

defendant's motion, I've given them the last word.

14

So I'll try to address them and hopefully cover

15

everything.

16

request that wa discussed yesterday by the

17

prosecution to ask Mr. Jiminez on cross-examination

18

about his use of other aliases and I'll sustain the

And I'll start first of all with the

19I defendant's, in affect, motion in limine to that
20
211

question.
Based on my reading of the Palmar case

22

which seams to say that bafora that kind of question

23

can ba asked, before a question can ba asked that

24

impugns in soma way the defendant, the prosecution

25 1 would hava to hava proof that would ba admissible of
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the fact that question would elicit.

So I sustain

the motion In limine and ask the prosecutor not to
do that.
In fact, I would agree with Mr. Flnlayson,
Mr. Lemcke, that any time that you're going to ask a
question that may be even remotely controversial, I
would ask that we approach the bench, iron that out
beforehand rather than just try the question and
have the objection made and then have the kind of
problem where we have to excuse the jury and do this
again and again or approach the bench.

I agree, I

would like to have you come forward first and then
we can resolve it.
I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial
however because, number one, with respect to
Mr. Lemcke 1 s question yesterday to Mr. Jlminez about
his use of aliases, it seems to me that's mitigated
somewhat by the fact that Mr. Jimines had admitted
on direct examination he used an alias and admitted
on cross-examination he lied and gave his health
care provider false information.

And Mr. Lemcke

then attempted to follow-up, at least that's one way
you could look at it, that same question that the
defense even asked him with other questions about
possible other aliases.
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1

And I'd further conclude based on what

I've

2

heard proffered here today that there are aliases

3

listed on the FBI rap sheet and although

4

Mr. Lemcke -- or the State rather doesn't have

5

admissible evidence that the defendant has used

6

other aliases, there was some basis for that

7

question, the aliases listed on the FBI rap sheet.

8

And the harm to -- the unfair harm to the

9

defendant's case does not, based on that problem

10
11

alone, require a mistrial.
Second, tha request for mistrial based on

12

questions to Mrs. Jiminas about whathar she was

13

aware that concealing a weapon is a crime, I agree

14

that tha fact that Mr. Jiminas may have brought with

15

him a weapon into tha stora, that it was concealed

16

and how he used it, may go to his state of mind.

17

And the question of whether or not he was the

18

initial aggressor or not, tha jury may find it

19

relevant that ha was armed in tha first place in

20

determining whathar or not ha or tha assailants were

21

tha aggressors.

22

conduct, would ba relevant.

23

characterized as illegal would not ba relevant.

24

I sustained tha objection.

25

So tha evidence itself, tha
The fact that it may be
And

The witness is not required to answer and
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1

again it's my judgment that there wasn't

sufficient

2 1 unfair harm to the defendant's case such that a
3

mistrial would be warranted.
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Thirdly, the question to Dr. Rothfeder

5

today about whether the defendant had informed him

6

during their consultation about other injuries

7

sustained as a result of violence, or words to that

8 1 effect, again other kinds of head injuries or
9

similar injuries that would have had a concussive

10

impact that Mr. Jiminez may have suffered would be

11

relevant.

12

The question or the part of it as to

13

whether they were sustained as the part of some

14

violent behavior would not be relevant.

15

sustained the objection, finding that that part of

16I the answer would not be relevant.

And again I

Whether he had

17

head injuries from any source that may have had this

18

concussive impact was relevant, but not how he

19I received them.
20

But again there's not enough unfair

damage to Mr. Jiminez 1 case based on that question

21I to warrant a mistrial.
22
23

And I'll deny the motion on

all three grounds.
But again Mr. Lemcke, I will emphasize in

24

the future bring those questions to the bench so we

25

don't face this situation again.
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THE COURT:

Again for the record the ten

jurors are present as well as the parties.
And counsel, we're now to the point of the
closing summary.

So Counsel for the State, would

you like to make an argument?
MR. LEMCKB:
THE COURT:
MR. LEMCKB:

The State would, your Honor.
You can proceed.
Thank you, your Honor,

Mr. Jiminez, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury.
I hope you 1 11 pardon ma for skipping over
the grand aloquanca flourish and just kind of
getting right down to the cases.

What we have is a

fairly unique case because of the evidence that is
here.

The State has charged Mr. Jiminez with one

count of murder, a firearm enhanced murder, and two
counts of attempted murder, again firearm enhanced,
for the death of Henry Miera that took place on
October 20th, 1996, and the shootings that took
place with, we contend, to kill or the attempt to
kill Anthony Montoya and Manuel Rios that same time,
same place.
We have these -- this we'll get into a few
minutes, all our charges are built around what are
called elements.

It's important for you to remember
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that each of these elements Is important.

If we

don't prove all the elements, we haven't proven our
case.

The State Is required to prove everything

beyond a reasonable doubt.

This is our burden, this

is what we must do.
We have again a fairly unique piece of
evidence in this videotape.

You, unlike almost any

other jury I can think of, have gotten to witness
the actual killing take place.

There is little

doubt mechanically about some of the things that
have happened here.

There is little doubt

—

there's no doubt what happened in terms of the death
of Mr. Miera, in that he was shot twice in the side
with a .45 caliber pistol that was fired by
Mr. Jiminez at him.

There is no doubt that

Mr. Jiminez, who fired at these other people, fired
approximately seven rounds that we know.
There is some dispute in somethings,
including some sequential things that happened here.
The dispute is two sided.

On the one side you have

Mr. and Mrs. Jiminez who have given us their
versions of the events.

On the other side you've

had Mr. Montoya literally who is speaking to us from
the dead in the interview, and Mr. Rios who came
here to court.

And there are some important

6

distinctions in what they say happened.
The Jiminezes in very brief summary, and
we'll get into that in a second, said that, in fact,
when they got to the 7-Eleven that Mr. Jiminez was
given some bad words by the three people.
got into a confrontation with them.

That he

That he was

struck and that he came up with a gun.
Mr. Montoya and Mr. Rios have told us a
somewhat different sequence.

They told us that,

yes, there was the verbal confrontation.
everybody went to get in on it.

That

That, in fact, at

one point the defendant was, and again Mr. Rios put
this three different ways at the three different
times of his testimony, going for a gun, he was
punched about the time that Rios saw the gun, and he
was reaching for a gun.

Maybe I have those wrong

one or another, but anyway, he said that the
defendant was going for a gun.
The defendant indeed told us at that point
in time that he had a -- the .45 caliber automatic
stuck in his pants with the T-shirt or the shirt
over it.

That when he saw that Mr. Montoya threw

the punch, that the defendant got up shooting and
then again that he does shoot Mr. Miera, he shoots
at the other two, he chases them in front of the car
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and the rest of the sequence of what happened.
You have a number of different charges that
you are to consider.
consider.

Not may consider, but you must

There's no particular sequence that you

are to consider them in.

You don't look at one and

say, well, this, that, then we move to the other.
You look at them in a package.

We start with the

death of Henry Miera, which is essentially the
essence of what we're doing today.
We have on the one hand murder.

And murder

is -- and again that is on or about on the 20th day
of October, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Defendant, Jose Mario Jiminez, caused the
death of Henry D. Miera.
that.

That's the time.

Salt Lake County.

All the evidence is of
That's the place.

It's in

This is the man who shot, and

that's the man who died.

And it was those bullets

that caused his death.
That the defendant then and there caused
the death, intentionally or knowingly is the next
element of murder, or intending to cause serious
bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life, which act caused the death
of Henry D. Miera, or acting under circumstances
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, the
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1

defendant engaged in conduct which created a grave

2

risk of death to another and caused the death of

3

Henry D. Miera, and that the defendant did so

4

unlawfully without legal justification.

5

Shooting someone in the side -- and there's

6

an instruction in there about intent, that intent

7

can be inferred when you shoot someone in the side,

8

twice in the torso, twice, it can be clearly

9

inferred that you were trying to kill them.

Or that

10

you were tending to cause serious bodily injury to

11

someone by shooting them twice in the side, or that

12

shooting someone twice in the side is an act of

13

depraved indifference to their particular human

14

life.

15

Then we get to the idea that the defendant

16

did so unlawfully without legal justification.

17

move then into the concept of legal justification.

18

Among these that is mentioned in this is defense of

19

self; was the defendant, Mr. Jiminez, defending

20

himself or was he defending another, his wife.

We

21

If, in fact, you find that he was defending

22

himself, committing -- or acting in self-defense, as

23

defined by the law, in the shooting of Mr. Miera, in

24

the shooting at Mr. Montoya, in the shooting at

25

Mr. Rios, Mr. Jimines is entitled to an acquittal.
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If you find that -- or if you find a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Jiminez did this acting in

<

self-defense as defined by the law, you ought to
acquit him.

I will argue to you and I will tell you

in a minute why, in fact, that is not the case.
Then we move to two other counts, to the
manslaughter counts.

Under the laws of the State of

Utah there are two circumstances which say if you
kill somebody and it would otherwise be murder, but
you are acting under extreme emotional disturbance
or incomplete or imperfect self-defense, which are
defined, then even though it would have been murder
and all the elements are met, that you should find
this person -- convict them of manslaughter, which
is a lesser offense than murder.

But again, if he's

acting in complete or perfect self-defense, he's
entitled to an acquittal.
But you have to look at the definitions
that take place in incomplete self

--or

self-defense, incomplete self-defense and extreme
emotional disturbance.

And then you have the duty,

it is your job to go back over to the evidence this
doctor told you.

These are things that you have to

consider, that's what you're here for.

Do the facts

fit the situation as described by the Jiminizes or
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by Mr. Montoya and Mr. Rios?
When you talk about self-defense, complete
self-defense, you're entitled to defend yourself
against another, against such other's eminent use of
unlawful force against you or the third person*
However, you are entitled to -- excuse me, you are
entitled to use force against that person, deadly
force, force that is intended or likely to cause
death or serious injury only under the law if you
reasonably believe that force is necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to you or
another.
And a person is not justified in
self-defense if he's attempting to commit,
committing, or fleeing from the commission of a
felony or he was the aggressor.
Then we get into the count -- the idea of
imperfect self-defense where under circumstances
where the actor reasonably believes the
circumstances provide a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct, although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the
circumstances.

In other words, I'm defending

myself, but he does so inappropriately.

But he has

reason that he's legally entitled to do so
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appropriately andI the law says he's not.
Extreme emotional distress must be
triggered by some thing external to the accused.
Such disturbance, extreme emotional disturbance,
therefore cannot have been brought by the
defendant's own p articular mental processes or by
his knowing or intentional involvement in a crime.
When we go back to the two circumstances,
the two versions of events, let us look at the event
of the Jiminezes in their version.

They got there,

Mr. Jiminez was cold cocked just out of the blue by
Mr. Rios.

Was he defending himself when he got up?

Did Mr. Rios rema in?

Possibly.

was there himself to defend?
wife to defend?

Was there some --

Yes.

Was there his

Yes.

Look aga in at the other version of events,
the Rios/Montoya version of the vents.

That at the

time Manuel Rios throws the punch. the defendant was
going for a gun.

He was going to gret into what had

been a verbal alt ercation, a name calling match.
looking at each o ther, going, have you got a
Have you got a

problem?

I don't have a problem.

problem?

What are you going to do about it?

I was

going to introduc e a gun, a firearm to a
name-calling contest.

Was pulling it out.
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Interestingly enough in the Montoya/Rios
version of events, there is a good example of
self-defense, complete self-defanse under the law of
the State of Utah, and that self-defense is on
behalf of Manual Rios who seeing someone coming up
with a gun, throwa a punch at that parson before
they could coma up with a gun.

And as you will see

when you look at tha tape, ha throwa that punch and
immediately ha turns his heel* and ha runs.
Now wa gat into those factora, ladies and
gentleman, that are tha external factora that I
submit to you will tall you which of these two
versions of avanta ia true.

And I put them to you

rhetorically in a number of questions.
First of all, you have seen Manual Rios.
And a fair amount of my questions to you are going
to be -- and they 1 re not queetione for you to answer
ma, I don't want you to aay this ia tha quaation and
have you give ma answers.

These are thinga that you

need to anawar among yourselves.
Rios.

Ha ia an anormoua man*

You've seen Manuel

You have seen the

defendant, Mr. Jiminas, ha ia not that big a man.
You've seen on videotape soma scale, in fact on two
different videotapaa, soma scale of how big Anthony
Montoya, Jr. ia.

I would submit to you

6

approximately the size of Mr. Jiminez.
Were Mr. Jiminez not the aggressor, were he
not the person who we now know by his own version
had gone ahead, gotten out of the car, pulled up his
shirt, stuffed the automatic in his pants, pulled
the shirt down and gone and gotten into this
situation.

We now see by the videotape he's walking

in, he hears something, he tells us it's murmurs, I
heard murmurs.

You hear murmurs, do you go ask

someone what's your problem?
situation.

He went back into the

He goes from turning into the Sev, he

turns back and goes over there to the car to
confront it.

He's got the sneaky-peeky, he knows

he's got the upper hand nobody knows about.
If you are Jose Jiminez and you're not the
aggressor and you know that you don't have that
hidden gun ready to go, do you get in the face of
Manuel Rios?

Do you get in the face of Manuel Rios

plus Junior Montoya?
If you're Manuel Rios, you know what looks
on this film to be a pretty good punch, you knock a
guy to the ground, and you are not doing that to get
away from somebody with a gun, do you throw a second
punch?

Do you kick him while he's down?

Do you

maybe do a victory dance over your fallen opponent?
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Why does a man like Manuel Rios throw the punch,
turning on his heels to get out of there unless he
was ducking out of tha way of tha gun?
How would Manual Rios -- and let's go to
what wa see of the defendant on tha night that ha
kills Ha nry Miera.

He's got that long shirt,

T-shirt on, sufficient to cover something tha size
of a .45 caliber.

And Detective Chidester told you

tha ona he showed you is tha smallest of the .45
callbar version.

Unless Jiminez is bringing

--at

laast br inging tha shirt up and having his hand on
tha gun, how do these guys sea it unless the
dafandant Is going for it alraady?
You remember -- you remember Mr. Moyes, not
Dr. Moyas, told us that that first bullet hola -remember wa want through tha whole thing with
Dr. Noyas yastarday, and wa got tha scraping and wa
got tha pealing and we've got tha groves and lands
and fina lly gat up and ask him on cross, Mr. Moyes,
whan wa gat down to tha question where is tha guy
standing r whan ha shot that bullet, oh, ha could hava
baan no mora than 15 inches off tha ground.
tha only> time someone was shooting?

When is

Whan the

dafandant was on tha ground.
How -- and you look at tha time frames, I
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want you to watch these time frames.

And it's such

a brief period of time with the shirt that's draped
over the gun, you gotta come up, you gotta get it
out, you gotta get it pointed.

Unless he had his

hand on it when he was hit, unless he was going for
it before he was hit, how is he able to shoot it in
that instantaneous period of time when he's on the
ground unless he had it is in his hand when he was
going down?

Because he was going for it when Manny

threw the punch.
What else makes sense?

Because it's what

Mr. Moyes tells us about from where down here that
shot came.

It's not like all those shots were into

the car not out of it.

And how quickly it must be

down -- if you look at the videotape, you're going
to see over these glass doors, Mrs. Jiminez is
standing there, Rios is over there when he throws
the punch and if you look very, very carefully, you
could see some of the muzzle flashes from when the
defendant was on the ground.

He had that gun in his

hand when he hit the ground because he went for it
when he was standing up and that's why Manny threw
the punch and that's why Manny ran.
Manny doesn't run from people.

Manny may

be a lot of things, but Manny isn't somebody who is

65

going to run from people, especially if he's got
somebody like Junior there next to him.
You notice this too, Junior is a little
slower on the uptake, it takes him just an instant
longer to run.

And you notice one third thing,

which is that car door.

Remember counsel saying in

his opening argument, well, he hasn't told you about
the car door in opening and closing.

I didn't tell

you about the 7-Eleven clerk ducking down behind the
counter either.

I didn't tell you about everything

you were going to see in the tape.

But if you look

at when the car door opens and closes, it opens and
closes when the defendant is on the ground shooting.
Because Henry Niera was trying to get away.
There's been these insinuations, innuendo,
insinuation, that oh, it was Henry Dennis Mlera that
had a gun in the car.

Let me ask you this.

If he

had a gun and was pointing it, why didn't he shoot?
If he had a gun and was pointing it, why would he
open the door?

If he had a gun and was shooting it

either right or left-handed, how would he get these
two parallel shots right through him in the side?
Because he didn't.

Because he just tried that

instant when the gun came out and everybody, oh, my
Qod, it's a gun, we're going to get out of here, he
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was going to get out of there and went the wrong
direction.
He opens the door and he closes it.
at the timing on that.

Look

Mr. Jiminez said it was

before that, much before that he's opening the door.
We 1 re only talking instance, we're only talking
seconds.

But that's when this all takes place.
The defendant comes up shooting.

defendant would say this is self-defense.

The
It is not

self-defense by law to bring a firearm to an
argument.

It is not self-defense by law to shoot

someone who punches you, even if they weren't
punching you to prevent them from shooting you.
It is not self-defense by law to come up
with a gun in the inference because we know he
killed one man, we know he shot at two others, that
he was going to come up there to kill you.
well, now it's self-defense.

To say,

It's not self-defense

by law if you are attempting to commit a felony.
And killing these people, folks, is a felony.
Shooting him is a felony.
Extreme emotional disturbance, I was hit,
it was pain.

The doctor, who is a substantial

witness, told us it hurts to get hit in the face.
But again, in your instructions, you look at what
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extreme emotional disturbance is, something external
to the accused, it therefore cannot have been
brought upon by his own particular mental processes
or by hi s knowing or intentional involvement in a
crime.
You can't say I'm going to pull a gun on
these guys and I get punched and get a surprised
punch, I was just disturbed.

I was just so

distraught at not getting it done in the first
place, that somebody hit me in the face, this is
disturb!ng to me, therefore it's an extreme
emotional disturbance.

I now have license to kill

one and trying to kill the other two.

No, that's

not how it is defined.
Imperfect self-defense that he was legally
entitled > to do that.

He wasn't entitled to

self-def ense because there was no imminent
directed . his way.

force

When he comes up shooting, the

man who hit him is running away.

When he comes up

shooting ', the other man is trying to run away.

When

he comes up shooting, the third man is sitting in
the car and flinching and getting killed.

And that

was the guy who wasn't even in the argument.
There are reasons to believe and not to
believe witnesses.

You look at Manuel Rios, would
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you want to get into a street fight on the wrong
side of Manuel Rios?
man.

No.

Manuel Rios is a violent

A man with a violet history, violent

tendencies.

He's in prison now.

in the past.

He has used guns

He came right out on the stand and

told you if he'd had a gun would he have thrown a
beer bottle?

You ask yourself from what you know of

Manuel Rios if Manny Rios had been shot at and
having his friends shot at and he would have had a
gun with him, would he have run away?
have shot back?

No.

Would he

Yes.

But the defendant is going to say, no, this
is imperfect self-defense.

It's not imperfect

self-defense because you don't even have the
foundation for self-defense.
directed against him.

There's no force being

Certainly no force being

directed against his wife when he gets up shooting.
Everybody else was trying to get the hell out of his
way because they'd seen him with a gun.
We then consider the credibility of the
Jimineses.
memory.

A couple with extremely selective

Mrs. Jiminez, she remembers I saw the

punch, my husband was trying to come in, I saw the
whole punch.
car door.

I didn't see the shooting.

Look at the video.

I saw the

Interesting situation
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to look at.
doorway.

She comes over and there is the open

Next to that open doorway there's the door

now swung open and propped open.

So you got the

door Itself, the wall, she goes over and gets behind
it.
What else is between her and her husband
and the car?

One extremely huge hunk of Rios.

You

take a 1 ook at that and you tell me if it is
credible that she saw her husband, the punch, the
car door , all that.

Although she didn't seem to see

or remember much else.
with him

Didn't know he took the gun

Didn't know he had the gun.
Mr. Rios -- or Mr., excuse me, Jiminez

himself, what he has told us is very interesting of
what he can't remember.

Oh, he can remember being

afraid and being punched and not going for the gun
and all this sort of good stuff.

He took the gun

with him because he was in fear for his life and
that of his spouse.
fear for his life.

He can't remember why he was in
He can't remember if he was

carrying a concealed firearm earlier that year.
can't remember if it was the year before.

He

He can't

remember why he decided to buy it, but it was
because he was in fear of his life.

It was such a

fearful event that he was going to go get this
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thing, put it in his pants, hide it, and go after
people.

But he can't tell us what that event was,

why he was in fear for his life.
He can't remember shooting.
remember aiming.
jam.

He can't

He can't remember clearing the

He can't remember loading the gun.

remember the recoil.

He can't

He can't remember those things

that are important to him.
Also I ask you this, in terms of the
defendant and his credibility as to the events, you
have had a chance to see not only the defendant in
this courtroom today and this week with how he
presents himself, with how he packages himself in
appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and
demeanor, in temper or lack thereof, you have seen
him in every one of those aspects on October 20th,
1996.

Is this an honest packaging?
Manny Rios was here in chains.

should be in chains.

Manny Rios

But Manny Rios isn't anything

except what Manny Rios is.

But you have -- and I

recall -- I want you to recall Mr. Shapiro's opening
statement, and he was talking about the newly -- the
couple, not newly married couple, but the couple,
they had gotten their child a baby-sitter and they
were able to go out for this date.

Just your
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1

average couple.

2

drunken rowdy trouble making boxers cruising for

3 1 trouble.

And on the other hand we had the

Is either one of those portrayals honest

4

now that you know the situation?

5

the packaging?

6

Or is it part of

We have had the doctor talk to us about

7I extreme emotional distress.
8 I translates into emotion.

About how pain

He talked to us in very

9

good detail about someone named Sanchez who in 1994

10

was beaten up in Los Angeles, had a depressed skull

111 fracture, the broken jaw, the broken arm.

The

12

defendant said, oh, that's me.

13

just lying to my medical providers because I wanted

14

the services I didn't have to pay for.

15

Sanchez, yeah, I was

And the doctor also talked in generalities

16 1 about someone who is hit with a punch like this.
17

One of the reasons he's talking in specifics about

18

'94 and generalities about '96, he -- the doctor had

19

no medical records to work from from what happened

20

in 1996.

He said a person might be hit like this,

21I they might react this way.

They -- and he looked at

22

the tape and talked about the defendant and he said,

23

trying to find the specific language, that he was

24

not completely aware.

25

and he said, yeah, that's different from being

Which I questioned him on,
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completely unaware.

And not completely aware and

completely unaware are two ends of the spectrum.
And the defendant was somewhere In the middle and he
couldn't put him on there.
Now I'm going to propose to you a theory
and it's one that I hope Manuel Rios will forgive me
for.

Maybe the punch wasn't all that good.

him down.

Even Manny said I thought it knocked him

out, but maybe it wasn't that good.
shooting.

Knocked

He got up

He got up shooting real fast.

Maybe the

defendant wasn't so hurt as to have this, you know,
not knowing where I am, not knowing that I'm
shooting, you know, not knowing that these people
are there, not knowing that, you know, I'm pulling
the trigger, not knowing that I'm aiming.

I don't

remember aiming.
You heard about the recoil on a .45.
boom.

Boom,

I don't know if any of you shoot, that's a

couple of pretty good shots together, nice pair of
parallel tracks right through poor Mr. Miera.

For

someone who doesn't remember all this but could
remember to chase the people, I mean, he went after
them.

He just didn't get up shooting and stagger,

he went after them.
the car.

He comes over, boom, boom into

It jams, he clears that, he runs around
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the car after them.
He tells his wife, you know, he knows
enough, come on, we got to get out of here*
over there.

They locked the car.

Got to go over

and unlock the car, let her in, drive away.
to go over to Amber Fabela'a.
car in her garage«

Get

He knew

Ha knew to hide the

He knew to go over to Judy's.

He knew to find some people that would help him to
get out of town and ditch the gun.

He knew he had

to do that.
What doaa thia say?

Two things it says.

one, ha 9 a pretty awara of what'a going on.

Two, he

doesn't think ha naada medical attention for this
horrible blow.

And ha 1 a a man who will seek medical

attention, even at someone else"a expense.
did other things.
anyone.

But he

He says, I don't remember killing

I don't remember knowing if anyone was hit.

What'a ha talking about whan ha gata ovar to Judy's
and Amber Fabela'a there?
him.

Killed him.

I killed

The defendant hae no mora told you the truth

than ha told the truth to hia medical providers in
Southern California, if indeed thoaa ara hla medical
records.
Intareatingly enough, the CAT scan, you
remember the impressions, no evidence of a skull
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fracture.

No evidence of a broken jaw.

of brain damage.
records.

No evidence

If these, in fact, are his medical

I think he's lying to the doctor here.
Complete self-defense because someone is

coming onto you with imminent force is belied by
your viewing of the tape.
one is threatening him.

When he's shooting, no
Imperfect

self-defense?

Kind of interesting in that although his head is so
scrambled for all that's going on of this terrible
punch he would tell you he suffered, he is reasoning
about the legal consequences of shooting at people.
Or that he's reasoning about the well-being of his
wife who he has taken to all these various
occasions, closed a bar with, come on over, and then
leaves.

Has her participate with him in hiding the

car, in and of itself a crime.

And then leaves her

for a period of years.
But yet, oh, no, I'm Jimmy Stewart.
the all-American virtue.
fair womanhood*

I'm

I'm just trying to defend

That's not true.

And the extrinsic

things, the idee of Manuel running, the idea of him
getting in Manuel's face, the idea that how does he
start shooting that quickly if he doesn't already
have the gun in his hand when he's hit.
By his version he gets knocked down on the
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ground, then he has to go for the gun
have to do to go for the gun?

Pull the shirt up,

get the gun out, get it pointed.
time for that.
went down.

What did he
,

There's not enough

He had the gun in his hand when he

He's just going for it when he's hit

because Manny Rios is telling you the truth, because
Junior is telling you the truth.
Oh, I thought I saw a person pointing a gun
at me.

And even though somebody may say, oh, this

is the OJ Simpson crime scene so this,r so that.
People were able to find five or six projectiles,
they're like that.
There was no gun.
were searched.

Guns would have been found.
There was no -- the trash cans

It was searched.

There was no gun.

And if Miera has a gun, why doesn't he shoot when he
sees the other guy going down with a gun?
has a gun, why doesn't he shoot?
bother to open the door?

And if he

Why does he even

If he's got a gun and is

pointing it, oh, no, I'm pointing it. so I will
wait, I'll open the door, I'll get on out, I'll do a
good job, I'll shoot.

Okay, get back in.

No, no,

it makes no sense.
You got to view the deportment of both the
defendant and his wife on the stand.

And from those

things they chose not to remember, you should choose
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not to believe them in any of this.

You should

choose to realize there is no self-defense because
there was no imminent force because this is in
reaction -- this is the defendant himself

committing

the crime and not allowed to commit -- or to call it
self-defense.

That he is the aggressor in this

because all these things are there.

That he is not

entitled to the extreme emotional disturbance of
something that's the product of his own actions.
That he is not entitled to imperfect

self-defense

because he wasn't entitled to self-defense in the
first place.
And this idea that he was somehow reasoning
it through is completely contradictory to the other
defense he's trying to put on.

He got up, he was

able to know what he was doing enough to put two
parallel bullet tracts through the chest of Henry
Dennis Miera.
With the medical records, even if we give
the defendant the benefit of the doubt that those
were his medical records, they were still not the
medical records detailing the injuries that took
place at the 7-Eleven.

They were something that

happened some years before that*

Again, we don't

have any medical records of the night because he
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choose not to seek help.
knew he must flee.

He sought to flee.

He

As the instructions tell you,

that is an indication of his guilty heart.
Ladies and gentlemen, again look at all the
evidence.

Watch the tape.

yourselves a few times.

Watch it among

Look at when these things

are happening, the sequence at which times they 1 re
happening.

Who has told you what happened when.

Realize the things about having to get the gun out
from behind the shirt.

Realize the packaging today

as it is today and as it was then.

Look at the

sequence of when that door is opened.

Look at how

quickly he's shooting after he's hit.

Look at Rios

turn his heels and run, almost in one simultaneous
motion with the left hook.

And realize that what

happened later that night was that the defendant not
out of gallantry towards his wife, no not out the
fear for himself, but just out of anger and perhaps
out of meanness went ahead and flat killed Henry
Dennis Miera, did so with a handgun.

And shot at

and tried to kill Manuel Rios and Junior Montoya.
It is not a contest between which couple
you prefer to have dinner with.
between which actually happened.

It is a contest
And it is a

contest between who, in fact, has been

straightforward with you, which witnesses told you
the truth*

That is why I believe you will find the

defendant guilty of murder, guilty of attempted
murder, guilty of a second count of attempted
murder, and guilty in each of those three counts of
using a firearm in the commission of those acts.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Counsel for the defendant.

MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, could we

approach briefly before?
THE COURT:

Yes.

(Side-bar conference.)
THE COURT:

All right, Counsel for the

defense, if you'd like to make your closing
statement*
MR. FINLAYSON:

Thank you, your Honor.

Try as I'm sure that you will, because I
know that you 1 re going to follow the law, you may
never be able to put yourself in the shoes of my
client that night.

But that's the law.

As judges

of my client, as judging the facts and bringing back
a verdict on my client, the law is that -- and all
the law mentions, the circumstances arising here,
the law is that you must put yourself in the shoes
of my client in those same circumstances.
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Scott and juror Michael Ross.
this time.

You are excused at

You are not permitted to deliberate.

We

thank you for your service.
Again, it's an unfortunate thing to have to
do it, but you have helped us just by serving to
this p oint in the proceedings and we appreciate it.
If you •d like to remain, watch the final outcome,
you may do so.

But only those eight who are to

serve as jurors can deliberate on the case.

So

thank you.
I'll ask those eight members to follow the
deputy into the jury room.
(The following proceedings were held in
open court out of the presence of the
jury.)
THB COURT:

You can be seated.

For the

record , Counsel, let me just ask, in fact, it was
Mr. Scott and Mr. Ross, isn't that correct, that
were the alternate jurors?
MR. LBMCKB:

As we understood, your Honor.

MR. FINLAYSON:

That's the way we

unders tood it, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay, just so we're clear.

Counsel for the defendant, you indicated that you
wanted to make a motion for mistrial.
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The record should reflect the jury has been
excused and this would be an appropriate time to do
that.

Go ahead if you would like.
MR. FINLAY30N:

j

Your Honor, during

counsel' s opening part of his closing argument he
referenced the character of our defendant, accusing
us of packaging him as a Jimmy Stewart.

Talking

about Rios being in chains as he should be at the
prison and our client sitting out here in the suit
and glasses and comparing him to the video.

He's

not allowed to comment on the character of our
client.

It was never a point put at issue by us.

We approached the bench and objected to that.
THE COURT:

You did.

MR. FINLAYSON:

And asked that there be a

mistrial.
We also took exception to -- we also take
exception to Mr. Lemcke's bringing up the concealed
weapon as showing our client's propensity to disobey
the law, which I think is exactly what all the
404(b) and 609 evidence is exactly trying to keep
out.

And that is trying to try Mr. Jiminez on the

merits and not on his propensity to disobey the law.
We would ask for a mistrial for that as well.
And that -- and I think I've made my
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objection clear on when Mr. Lemcke started into the
fact that the jury had not been dealt with in a
straightforward manner.

I think he - - that the jury

could take that and it is certainly reasonable for
them to take that that we were hiding something from
them or that I have done something improper in this
trial.

It's your Honor's province to decide whether

there's something improper going on and I take
exception to that.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Lemcke, your response to the motion for
a mistrial on those three ground?
MR.

LEMCKE:

Your Honor, first of all

there -THE COURT:
MR.

Pardon me.

LEMCKE:

There are three grounds and

the idea that: -- we talked about the deportment of
the defendant, you know, here and there.

And that

those are different affects is proper comment on the
deportment of a witness.

The defendant did take the

stand in thiii particular case.
clearly at issue.
credibility.

His credibility is

We, in fact, attacked his

In fact, the second - - o r the third

thing that counsel complains about is that we talked
about --
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THE COURT:

Being unfairly dealt with.

MR. LEMCKE:

Oh, that the jury was not

being dealt straightforward with.
THE COURT:

Or straightforward.

MR. LEMCKE:

And that is simply talking

about I don't think that the defendant and his wife
were telling them the truth.
on Mr. Finlayson.

I was not commenting

If Mr. Finlayson has some ill at

ease with that, I apologize to him.
apologize for the process, though.

I do not even
Because I think

I'm entitled to comment on the defendant, as any
other witness, whether or not I believe he's telling
the truth.

And I think that so much of what he said

was transparently false and that is the comment on
that.
The other issue is -- deals with Manuel
Rios being in chains.
different time.

That was mentioned at a

To hear counsel's complaint it

would be, well, here is the defendant over here in a
suit, and here is Manuel in chains.
about Manuel a lot.

No, I talked

In fact, to comment in my

rebuttal, where counsel said, oh, he's an NFL
lineman, I said he's not an NFL lineman, he's a USP
inmate.

We've never sold him as a church warden.

We've only let Manuel be Manuel.
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1

And to somehow cobble together the comments

2I on Manuel as a backslded comment on the defendant, I
3 1 don't know If that shows something of the mind set
4 1 of counsel, it's more so than what happened actually
5 1 in court.

So I don't think that his comments are at

6 1 all well made.

And his motion for mistrial

7 I certainly isn't.
THE COURT:

8
9

second ground?

10I

MR. LEMCKE:

Ill

THE COURT:

12
13I

Did you want to comment on the

Which was?
The firearm, the -- counsel

said -MR. LEMCKE:

Oh, on the firearm.

The

14

problem with that was that in his close

15

Mr. Pinlayson went into a speech about, well,

16

there's a second amendment.

17

whether people are entitled to have them or not,

18

there are permits*

19

case, the second amendment or people having permits.

20

We never got into that.

21

into that.

22

back and talk about we didn't talk about permits.

23

We talked about the fact that he concealed a weapon

24

and went into this.

25

things, a propensity for crime and aggression.

We're not talking about

They had nothing to do with the

We weren't going to get

And Z have a right to rebut and come

And that he has, among other
And
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1

that was, you know, clearly central to the issues of

2

this case.
So 1bo somehow come out as thi s is

3
4

everything that's said when I reference the

5

defendant is somehow 403 or 404(b), is fallacious.

6

I get to comment on the defendant as a witness and I

7

get to comment on the defendant as an actor.

8

that is what the issue is about.

9

complain about everything that comes i n against

And

And to simply

10

their client is violative and only there to smear

11

him, just isn't true.
THE COURT:

12
13

Okay.

It's your motion,

Counsel.

14

MR.

FINLAYSON:

Nothing else on that.

I

15

guess I should -- I forgot to put one thing on the

16

record.

I'll submit those.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

Okay.

FINLAYSON:

But when we - - we did

19

approach the bench when Mr. Lemcke indicated that he

20

believed I'd mischaracterized the law.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR.

On aggravated assault.

FINLAYSON:

On aggravated assault.

And

23

I think I'd ask the Court to instruct them on the

24

statute of aggravated assault.

25

don't remember what you asked for the judge to do.

And Mr • Lemcke, I

MR. LEMCKE:

Your Honor, I asked you

actually to do nothing.

Except, you know, I did not

object to you saying that the law of aggravated
assault was not a part of this case.

And that the

different counsels disagree on certain issues in
this, which is true.

Also it should be part of the

record that it was the defense who didn't want
aggravated assault instructed in this particular
manner.

The instructions say that they contain all

the law that's necessary and Mr. Finlayson chose to
go beyond the jury instructions to get into an issue
of law that we weren't -- that apparently they
weren't set up for.
THE COURT:

I guess we could just deal with

this last one, give the jury a supplemental
definition of aggravated assault, if you wanted to
do it.
MR. LEMCKE:

I would object. Your Honor.

MR. FINLAYSON:
THE COURT:

That's what I'd ask for.

But you wanted me to, as I

understand it, Mr* Finlayson, from our discussion
here, you wanted me to tell the jury that your
characterization of aggravated assault was correct,
and I wasn't prepared to do that.
MR. FINLAYSON:

No, I did ask the Court
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then to instruct them -- I'd read off the statute is
what I had done to instruct them on serious bodily
injury and aggravated assault because that's what I
had read off of.
MR.

LEMCKE:

But at that point, your Honor,

counsel said broken teeth constitute various bodily
injury under the law and that is absolutely
incorrect.
THE

COURT:

Counsel, I appreciate what you

were both arguing at this time.

And it's at least

arguable whether or :not that Mr. Jiminez was a
victim of an aggravated assault.

So I hesitate to

tell the jury that d efinitively.

So I guess my

question now is aggravated assault hae been
explained -- it's been relied on by the defense as
an explanation as to why they feel self-defense was
necessary.

Wouldn't it be helpful to now tell the

jury in a brief instruction what aggravated assault
is and let then decide for themselves?
MR.

LEMCKE:

TBS

COURT:

MR.

LEMCKE:

I wouldn't think so, your

Honor*
And why would you feel that

way?
Well, because, again, you

know, it is not the statute, the law which was read,

70

1

but it is th<a interpretation in the case law that

2

matters whether or not this idea of broken teeth

3

being serious bodily injury is there.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR.

6

Well, what we - -

LEMCKE:

Unless we want to start

reading the several cases that deal with this.
THE COURT:

7

No, my suggestion is that we

8

just define aggravated assault, nothing more.

9

make any -- not instruct the jury as to whether

10

broken teeth are or are not -MR.

11
12

Not

FINLAY30N:

That's what I would like,

your Honor.
MR.

13

LEMCKE:

And we would object to it.

We

14

think it's surplusage and we think that they've gone

15

into the jury box now, it's an invasion.
THE COURT:

16

I'm not sure that it's an

I' 11 consider. It counsel, if you'd look

17

invasion.

18

to draft the instruction having nothing more than

19

the elements of aggravated assault.

20

look and I'll take a look whether or not it's legal

21

at this point to add a supplemental instruction to

22

the jury.
FINLAYSON:

23

MR.

24

THE COURT:

25

I'll take a

Thank you, your Honor.

Now, in terms of the motion for

mistrial, I'll deny it.

First of all, the comments

70

of the prosecuting attorney explaining to the jury
that, in fact, Mr. Jiminez is not Jimmy Stewart, if
I've characterized his description truthfully, is in
my judgment not a comment on the character of
Mr. Jiminez.

Again in opening arguments and during

Mr. Jiminez 1 own testimony, the defendant

attempted

to present to the jury an appearance or an image of
what Mr. Jiminez was like and what his intention
was.

It's not inappropriate for the prosecutor to

make an effort to contradict that image.

And in my

judgment, that's what Mr. Lemcke was trying to do.
On the second ground, commenting that I
believe something to do with the propensity to
violate the law as shown by carrying an illegal
firearm.

It's a touchy area, I grant, but on the

other hand the defense implied through its closing
argument that Mr. Jiminez had a second amendment
right to carry a firearm*
It didn't quite go that far, but said words
to th* effect of to the jury that haven't they heard
about; the second amendment*

The clear implication

is that th* defendant has a constitutional right to
have this gun*

Apparently there's some evidence

that he doesn't have a constitutional right to have
a gun for various reasons.

Among them possibly

70

1

because he's an illegal alien.

2

The State didn't make that comment and, in

3

fact, couldn't have made that comment in my

4

judgmen t.

5 1 do so.

It would have been misconduct for them to

But to follow-up and explain as they do that

6

the issue is not so much that the defendant has a

7

constitutional right to have a gun, but as to what

8

the gun may show about his state of mind and who, in

9

fact, was the aggressor.

Which I think was the

10

essence of what the prosecutor was saying, and again

11

in my judgment is not prosecutorial misconduct.

12

I deny 1the motion for a mistrial on those grounds.

13

And

And thirdly, the prosecutor's statement

14

that he didn't feel that the jury was being dealt

15

with in a straightforward manner or an honest

16

manner, Mr. Finlayson, I think if counsel had said

17

that I 1bhink the prosecutor is lying to you

18

the deftansa counsel, rather, is lying to you or

19

misrepresented something to you, I would agree.

20

his statements can be construed that the defendant

21

himself was lying or the defense witnesses were

22

lying and the jury wasn't being told the truth.

23

didn't <accuse you personally of anything, and

24

therefore again it wouldn't be prosecutorial

25

misconduct in my judgement.

--or

But

He

There is no reason to

declare a mistrial and so I won't.
But I'll consider submitting an aggravated
assault instruction if you can draw one up quickly.
And I'll try to take a look at the law to see if it
would be appropriate even though the jury has been
sent to the jury room to deliberate to add that
instruction at this point.
We'll be in recess.
MR.

FINLAYSON:

MR.

LBMCKB:

Thank you.

And your Honor, before I'd

submit that I'd ask the Court to look at -- I
believe there's case law, it was Justice Zimmerman.
I can't remember the case, but he said that things
like broken fingers. broken noses and I believe
broken teeth do not arise to an aggravated assault
level.
THE

COURT:

Your argument there is that by

law -- as a matter o f law this couldn't be an
aggravated assault*
MR.

LBMCKB:

TBS

COURT:

jury that, Counsel.

Correct.
I'm not prepared to tell the
Let me just explain to them

what aggravated assault is and draw their own
conclusion.
MR. PINLAYSON:

Your Honor, it appears that
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